1. The parties are landlord and tenant.

2. The landlord has leased his premises to the tenant under the deed of lease dated 11.5.1981. The parties agreed in writing inter alia that the lessee (tenant) agreed to "use the leased premises to run paint business as mentioned in clause (7) of the lease."

3. In clause 8 of the agreement, the parties agreed that if the lessee violates any of the clauses of the agreement, eviction would follow.

4. The tenant started the business of paint and later changed it to the business of toys. The landlord claimed to injunct the tenant from starting the business. He claimed that, without his written permission, the leased premises cannot be used for any other business because a specific business is shown in the agreement upon which the landlord has leased the premises to the tenant. He has obtained the necessary injunction. There are concurrent findings of fact. In fact, these are admitted facts.

The only substantial question of law that is required to be answered is:--

"Whether the appellants intending to conduct the other business in the leased premises in addition to the business specified in the lease agreement, would amount to committing breach of the term of the lease agreement and consequently whether the Courts below were right in granting injunction restraining the appellants from starting other businesses in the shop?"

5. The relation between the landlord and the tenant is not like that of other contractual parties. Tenants are specifically protected under the various tenancy laws. Tenants can be evicted only on specified grounds. It would have to be seen whether the tenant can be otherwise evicted without statutory violation as would result in eviction.

6. The agreement between the parties shows the user of leased premises to run the paint business of the tenant. There are two specified broad users:- residential user and commercial user which cannot be changed or altered without the permission of the landlord and in accordance with other laws. Within the broad user for commercial purpose, the user for paint business specified in the agreement would show the intention of the lessee at the time of lease to carry on a particular business made known to the landlord/lessor. It has no other implication upon his possession as a tenant. The agreement therefore specifies the precise kind of business that has to be conducted by the tenant and is allowed by the landlord. There is no other restriction on the user in the agreement between the parties. There is no specific mandate not to use the leased premises for any business other than the paint business. It will have to be seen whether in the absence of a negative covenant, the tenant's freedom to carry on any business other than the specified business is prohibited or restricted.

7. The learned counsel on behalf of the landlord has drawn the Court's attention to the two judgments of the Supreme Court. In the judgment in the case of Hari Rao Vs. N. Govindachari, AIR 2005 SC 3389 and M. Arul Jothi Vs. Lajja Bal, AIR 2000 SC 1122, the Supreme Court considered restrictive covenants in a tenancy agreement. The question before the Supreme Court was when the tenant uses a shop for a purpose other than the one specified in the tenancy agreement, would he be liable for eviction. In that case there was a specified restrictive covenant which ran thus:-

“shall be used by the tenant only for carrying on his own business dealing in radios, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture and for nonresidential purposes and the tenant shall not carry on any other business than the above said business.”

8. The tenant commenced the business of provisions of parts of cycles and the like. The tenant contended that he had not changed the commercial user and the tenant was not using the tenanted premises for residential purpose which would constitute different purpose. Indeed, it was observed that change of business does not change its use from commercial p