The main legal point established is that a public charitable trust seeking eviction for its own occupation under Section 16(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, is not required to prove reasonable and bona fide need as other landlords are.

1. By order dated 28-08-2013 notice for final disposal of this writ petition was issued. Accordingly, I have heard Shri M.G. Sarda, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner and Shri H.D. Dangre, Advocate along with Shri A.N. Ansari, Advocate for the respondent.

Rule. Rule heard forthwith with the consent of parties.

2. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the judgment passed by the learned District Judge-11, Nagpur in an appeal filed under Section 34 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (for short, 'the said Act'). By aforesaid judgment, the suit for eviction of tenant which was decreed by the trial Court has been dismissed by allowing the said appeal.

3. The petitioner/original plaintiff is a trust registered under provisions of Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950. As it was in need of the suit premises that was occupied by the tenant, the trust filed Regular Civil Suit No.239 of 2005 for eviction on the ground of the tenant being in arrears of rent and that the trust required the premises for the purposes of the trust. The aforesaid suit was filed against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through one D. Kalamkar. Written statement was filed by D. G. Kalamkar claiming to be one of the legal heirs of M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar. The trial Court after considering the material on record, decreed the suit under provisions of Section 16 (1)(g) of the said Act. However, eviction on the ground of the tenant being in arrears of rent was not permitted. The present respondent filed appeal under Section 34 of the said Act. The appellate Court allowed the appeal on two grounds; firstly, that the suit as filed was against a dead person and hence the same was not tenable. Secondly, that the claim of the landlord was required to be examined in terms of provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act and as there were no pleadings or compliance of the aforesaid provisions, the decree passed by the trial Court was contrary to law. Hence, the trust has filed the present writ petition.

4. Shri M.G. Sarda the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the suit was filed against M/s Baliram Vithoba Teli/Kalamkar through D. Kalamkar and hence, it could not be said that the same was filed against a dead person. It was further submitted that the pleadings in the plaint clearly indicated that the suit premises was required by the trust for its activities and hence the adjudication by the trial Court under provisions of Section 16(1)(g) of the said Act was proper. He submitted that the case of the trust did not fall under provisions of Section 16(1)(i) of the said Act and the lower appellate Court has proceeded on a wrong premise in that regard. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mohanlal Kisanlal Agrawal and others Vs Ajitnath Jain Shwetambar Mandir Trust, Nagpur and others, reported in 2011(2) Mh.L.J. 512, to demonstrate that the present petitioner was the respondent therein and its claim was considered on merits. The learned Counsel further relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Sudha Sumant Barve Vs Ranjana Ramesh Padhye, reported in 2013(4) Mh.L.J. 735, to urge that a suit filed against a mother representing interest of her minor children without impleadment of the children was maintainable. The learned Counsel further relied upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Annasaheb Balesha Waghe and others Vs Appasaheb Dada Pommai and others, reported in 2008 (1) Civil LJ 130, to urge that it was not necessary to file specific cross objections and the findings recorded by the trial Court against the respondent could be shown to be incorrect. He, therefore, submitted that the judgment passed by the lower appellate Court was required to be set aside.

5. Shri H.D. Dangre, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the lower appellate Court had rightly found that as th