The main legal point established in the judgment is the impermissibility of stigmatic termination without following due procedure, emphasizing the importance of natural justice principles and proper evidence in disciplinary proceedings.

1. Heard.

2. Rule.

3. By consent, Rule is made returnable forthwith and the petition is taken up for final disposal.

4. The issue raised by the petitioner is as regards termination of her services as, Anganwadi Karyakarti, without compliance of the principles of natural justice and by way of punishment.

5. Shri Rodge, learned Advocate straight away points out at the show cause notice issued to the petitioner. Allegations have been set out in the said notice against the petitioner and she has been called upon to explain within 24 hours, as to why her services should not be terminated.

6. Shri Rodge then points out the order of termination dated 2.7.2013 which sets out a list of mis-conducts alleged to have been committed by the petitioner and for which she has been terminated with immediate effect.

7. The petitioner raised a grievance before the Chief Executive Officer, Zilla Parishad, Latur by preferring an appeal, contending therein that the petitioner has been terminated after having put in 21 years in service on the basis of such allegations which have not been committed, much less proved.

8. By the impugned order dated 20.8.2013 the appeal of the petitioner has been rejected. Shri Rodge, points out that the impugned order is about a page or so and the reason adduced by the CEO for rejecting the appeal is of one sentence, which is, “The conduct of the appellant has not improved despite oral and written communications and, therefore, her services are terminated in the light of Government Resolution dated 12.4.2007. Appeal stands rejected.”

9. Shri Rodge, therefore, submits that the impugned order is without reasons and without considering the fact that the petitioner is a “workman” and the ICDS Scheme under which she has been working with the respondent has been declared to be an “industry” in the light of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Vidya Vishnu Vanare Vs. State of Maharashtra [2011 (2) Mah. L.J. 221]. He, therefore, submits that the principles of natural justice have been violated and the petitioner could not have been terminated in such a fashion.

10. Shri Tandale, learned Advocate for respondent Nos. 2 to 4 – Zilla Parishad authorities submits that the Government Resolution referred in the impugned order empowers the Zilla Parishad to terminate the services of an Anganwadi Sevika with immediate effect if her conduct does not improve. He further submits that the Government Resolution dated 5.8.2010 enables the petitioner to avail of the remedy of approaching the Divisional Commissioner (Revenue) for the redressal of his grievance.

11. He submits that the charges levelled upon the petitioner are of grave and serious nature. She cannot be pardoned. She deserves to be terminated as her working is not proper and her conduct does not seem to improve. He, therefore, submits that the petitioner may withdraw her petition and approach the Divisional Commissioner (Revenue) or else the petition be dismissed.

12. I have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates for the respective sides, along with the learned AGP on behalf of the State. There is no dispute that the petitioner has been terminated after putting in 21 years' of service for allegedly committing several mis-conducts.

13. The learned Division Bench of this Court in paragraph Nos.8 to 11 of the Vidya Vishnu Case (supra) has held that an Anganwadi Sevika / Madatnis / Helper is a “workman” as the Zilla Parishad operating the ICDS Scheme is an “industry”. Paragraph Nos. 8 to 11 of the said judgment read as under:-

“8. Looking to the above functions of these Anganwadi Sevikas and workers, prescribed by the Government and the very scheme which is in vogue since 1975 and the activities under the said scheme, we are of the view that the Anganwadi Sevikas and Anganwadi helpers and in particular the present Petitioner are 'workman' within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the scheme under which they are performi