P.V. Hardas, J.

1. This appeal filed under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (for short hereinafter referred to as M.C.O.C. Act), challenges the correctness of the decision of the Special Judge, M.C.O.C. Act, Pune in M.C.O.C. Special Case No. 7 of 2013, being an order below Exhibit 63, dated 2nd August, 2014. By virtue of the order impugned in the present appeal, the Special Judge allowed the application at Exhibit 63 and thereby discharged the applicant therein/Original Accused No. 3, along with the other accused, from the provisions of Section 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) of the M.C.O.C. Act and requested the Principal District Judge, Pune to assign the trial to a competent court.

2. The present impugned order is a sequel to an earlier order which was passed by the Special Judge, M.C.O.C. Act, dated 11/2/2014. The State Government had challenged the aforesaid order before the Division Bench of this court and during hearing, the learned counsel representing the respondent, urged that there were certain other aspects which had not been urged before the trial court. The Division Bench also upon perusal of the order impugned therein i.e. in Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 2014, noticed that certain factual aspects of the case had not been considered and no finding had been recorded with regard to those facts. The Division Bench, therefore, by its order dated 26/6/2014 allowed the appeal and quashed and set aside the impugned order and remitted the matter back to the Special Judge for a decision afresh in accordance with law. Pursuant thereto, the present impugned order has been passed, against which the present appeal has been filed.

3. It appears that the respondent herein had filed an application at Exhibit 63 in essence praying that he may be discharged from the provisions of the M.C.O.C. Act. The trial court accepted the submissions of the accused and accordingly discharged him. We may briefly advert to the findings which have been recorded by the trial court.

The learned trial Judge has held/observed that, "Causing of bomb explosions would not convert a terrorist act or an act of insurgency into "promoting insurgency". The trial judge further recorded a finding that insurgency and promoting insurgency were two different aspects and the act alleged against the accused was an act of insurgency and, therefore, would not be an act promoting insurgency. The trial judge further recorded a finding that the act of terrorism or an act of terrorist as is defined under "The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (for short hereinafter referred to as "UAPA") would not be an offence under the M.C.O.C. Act. The trial judge further recorded a finding that in cases of serial bomb blasts, it would not be a case of "organised crime" as it would not amount to committing any activity of promoting insurgency. The trial court came to the conclusion that once an act of insurgency had been committed, the said act cannot amount to promoting insurgency. The trial judge, therefore, with the above and other findings allowed the application filed by the accused and discharged all the accused from the provisions of the M.C.O.C. Act.

4. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. Sunil Manohar, the learned Advocate General has urged before us that if two enactments have identical ingredients in respect of an offence, the accused could only be prosecuted under one enactment. However, if the ingredients of the offences under the two or more enactments are different, prosecution under both the Acts would be maintainable. The learned Advocate General further submitted before us that the ingredients of the offence under the UAPA and the M.C.O.C. Act are distinct and separate, though there may be slight overlapping and, therefore, the bar under Section 26 of the General Clauses Act would clearly not apply. The learned Advocate General amplified his submission by urging before us that the UAPA is directed against the terrorist act per se, while