Ravindra V. Ghuge, J.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties.

2. The issue raised in this petition is with regard to the interference of the Industrial Court in an order of suspension which has been issued by the employer under Standing Over 25(5) of the Model Standing Orders, pending disciplinary proceedings.

3. The petitioner/Management is aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 15/02/2016 by which Complaint (ULP) No.33/2014 filed by the respondent/employee has been partly allowed and the suspension order dated 07/06/2014 has been quashed and set aside.

4. Mr. Prabhakaran, learned Advocate for the Management submits that a charge sheet cum-show cause notice had been issued to the respondent on 27/09/2015. After considering his reply, disciplinary proceedings in the nature of a domestic enquiry under the Model Standing Orders has been initiated. Owing to the order of suspension dated 07/06/2014, the respondent is paid subsistence allowance in accordance with standing order 25(5).

5. He submits that the Industrial Court has delivered the impugned order without considering the effect of Standing Order 25(5) and Standing Order 25(5A). By the impugned judgment, reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India, [(2015) 7 SCC 291], without considering the fact that the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court is with regard to speedy trial in criminal cases and has nothing to do with the Model Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Bombay) Rules.

6. He further submits that the Industrial Court, by its conclusion in paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment has concluded that “The enquiry is not concluded in three months. It amounts to unfair labour practise. Enquiry cannot be prolonged in the absence of written order of the Enquiry Officer. The respondent can be said to be indulged in unfair labour practise. The suspension order is passed upto pendency of enquiry. Such type of suspension order is nothing but malafide act of the respondent. It is also illegal act. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the complainant succeeded in proving the unfair labour practise under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. Still, to have some time in the form of opportunity to the respondent to conclude the enquiry within a month, it will be just and proper to direct the respondent to allow the complainant to resume on duty within one month from passing of this order.”

7. Mr.Prabhakaran, therefore, submits that the Industrial Court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law and has lost sight of the fact that an employer can suspend an employee pending disciplinary action subject to the obligation to pay suspension allowance till the suspension lasts.

8. Mr. Kamble, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the sole respondent has strenuously attempted to defend the judgment. Contention is that the respondent is the President of a Union. The suspension order is malafide and defamatory. There is no reason to suspend the respondent but for the fact that the employer desires to keep the respondent out of the premises.

9. He further submits that the suspension is aimed at weakening the respondent and for disintegrating the Union. The enquiry is being unnecessarily prolonged. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) has concluded that the suspension should not be continued beyond 3 months. The enquiry is conducted beyond 3 months and therefore the suspension as well as the enquiry deserve to be quashed and set aside.

10. He relies upon the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent in support of his contention.

11. I have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates and have gone through the affidavit in reply filed by the respondent.

12. It is not in dispute that the complaint filed by the respondent under the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 is for challenging the suspension order by invok