IMPORTANT POINT
The philosophy and logic behind section 167(2) Cr PC should be extrapolated to cases of prolonged suspension. A time limit for filing charge sheet as in section 167(2) should be imposed in case of suspension also.
Held, suspension should not continue beyond three months. The employee, if required, to avoid influencing investigation at local level may be transferred out

JUDGMENT

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The Appellant assails his suspension which was effected on 30.9.2011 and has been extended and continued ever since. In November, 2006, he was posted as the Defence Estate Officer (DEO) Kashmir Circle, Jammu & Kashmir. During this tenure it was discovered that a large portion of the land owned by the Union of India and held by the Director General Defence Estates had not been mutated/noted in the Revenue records as Defence Lands. The Appellant alleges that between 2008 and 2009, Office-notes were prepared by his staff, namely, Shri Vijay Kumar, SDO-II, Smt. Amarjit Kaur, SDO-III, Shri Abdul Sayoom Technical Assistant, and Shri Noor Mohd., LDC, that approximately four acres of land were not Defence Lands, but were private lands in respect of which NOCs could be issued. These NOCs were accordingly issued by the Appellant. Thereafter, on 3.4.2010, the Appellant was transferred to Ambala Cantt. However, vide letter dated 25.1.2011 the Appellant was asked to give his explanation for issuing the factually incorrect NOCs. In his reply the Appellant admitted his mistake, denied any mala fides in issuing the NOCs, and attributed the issuance of the NOCs to the notes prepared by the subordinate staff of SDOs/Technical Officer. It was in this background that he received the Suspension Order dated 30.9.2011. Various litigation was fruitlessly initiated by the Appellant in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, as well as in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, with which we are not concerned. The Appellant asserts that since the subject land was within the parameter wall of the Air Force Station, no physical transfer thereof has occurred. On 28.12.2011 the Appellant's suspension was extended for the first time for a further period of 180 days. This prompted the Appellant to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (CAT), and during the pendency of the proceedings the second extension was ordered with effect from 26.6.2012 for another period of 180 days. The challenge to these extensions did not meet with success before the CAT. Thereafter, the third extension of the Appellant's suspension was ordered on 21.12.2012, but for a period of 90 days. It came to be followed by the fourth suspension for yet another period of 90 days with effect from 22.3.2013.

3. It appears that the Tribunal gave partial relief to the Appellant in terms of its Order dated 22.5.2013 opining that no employee can be indefinitely suspended; that disciplinary proceedings have to be concluded within a reasonable period. The CAT directed that if no charge memo was issued to the Appellant before the expiry on 21.6.2013 of the then prevailing period the Appellant would be reinstated in service. The CAT further ordered that if it was decided to conduct an Inquiry it had to be concluded “in a time bound manner”. The Appellant alleges that the suspension was not extended beyond 19.6.2013 but this is not correct. The Respondent, Union of India filed a Writ Petition before the Delhi High Court contending that the Tribunal had exercised power not possessed by it inasmuch as it directed that the suspension would not be extended if the charge memo was served on the Appellant after the expiry of 90 days from 19.3.2013 (i.e. the currency of the then extant Suspension Order). This challenge has found favour with the Court in terms of the impugned Judgment dated September 04, 2013. The Writ Court formulated the question before it to be “whether the impugned directions circumscribing the Government's power to continue the suspension and also to issue a chargesheet within a time bound manner can be sustained”. It opined that the Tribunal's view was “nothing but a substitution of a judicial determination to that of the authority possessing the power, i.e., the Executive Government as to the justification or rationale to continue with the suspension”. The Writ Petition was allowed and the Central Government was di