2017 Supreme(Bom) 1442
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD
RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
Mohd. Haroon & Another – Petitioners
Versus
Mohd. Younus & Others – Respondents
Writ Petition No. 4831 of 2015
Decided On : 12-09-2017
For the Petitioner:Girish K. Thigale (Naik), Advocate.
For the Respondent:Meraj Khan h/f A.S. Bayas, Advocates.
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the availability of an alternate remedy does not preclude the exercise of inherent powers for restoration under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially when it would cause hardship to the litigating parties.
Headnote:
Restoration - Civil Procedure - Order VII Rule 11, Order VII Rule 13, Order IX Rule 2, Order IX Rule 4 - The judgment discusses the interpretation and application of Order VII Rule 11 and Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 for restoration of a suit. The court also refers to the legal provisions defining decree and the appeal process, emphasizing the distinction between orders and decrees and the availability of appellate remedies.
Fact of the Case:
The Trial Court allowed the restoration of a suit that was earlier rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Petitioners challenged this restoration, arguing that the Trial Court had no power to restore the suit once it was rejected.
Finding of the Court:
The Court found that the restoration of the suit under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was justified, considering the absence of an express bar in the provisions. It emphasized that the availability of an alternate remedy did not preclude the exercise of inherent powers for restoration, especially when it would cause hardship to the litigating parties.
Issues: The main issue was whether the Trial Court had the authority to restore a suit that was rejected under Order VII Rule 11, and whether the availability of an alternate remedy barred the exercise of inherent powers for restoration.
Ratio Decidendi: The Court held that unless there is an express bar, there cannot be an implied embargo on seeking restoration under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It emphasized that the availability of an alternate remedy did not preclude the exercise of inherent powers for restoration, especially when it would cause hardship to the litigating parties.
Final Decision: The Writ Petition challenging the restoration of the suit was dismissed, and the Court upheld the Trial Court's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the restoration of the suit.
1. The Petitioners are aggrieved by the order dated 24.03.2015 by which the Trial Court has allowed Miscellaneous Application No.17/2015 and restored Special Civil Suit No.30/2012 by setting aside the order of rejection of the suit dated 11.12.2014.
2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner submits in brief as follows:
(a) On 13.11.2014, the order of issuing summons in the suit was passed.
(b) As the Plaintiff did not deposit copies and process fees, an order dated 03.12.2014 was passed by the Trial Court directing compliance.
(c) As compliance was not made, by order dated 11.12.2014, the Plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
(d) Once a plaint is rejected under the above provision, the Trial Court has no power to restore the suit considering Order VII Rule 13.
(e) If the suit would have been dismissed under Order IX Rule 2, the Trial Court had the power to restore the suit if an application for restoration was made under Order IX Rule 4.
(f) The Miscellaneous Application for restoration of the plaint dismissed under Order VII Rule 11(f), was not maintainable.
3. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in the matter of Abdul Rashid Rather vs. Ghulam Ahmad Ganai, AIR 2011 Jammu and Kashmir 29.
4. Specific reliance is placed on paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the said judgment, which read as under:
"7. Section 2 (2) defines decree as under:
(2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not include -
(a) Any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
(b) Any order of dismissal for default.
8. It is clear from a plain reading of the above provision that an order rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is a decree. Order 41 CPC provides for appeals from original decrees. In terms of Section 34 Civil Courts Act, 1920-AD, an appeal from a decree of a Sub-Ordinate Judge is to lie to the District Judge.
9. From a conjoint reading of aforesaid provisions it follows that an appeal from original decree passed by a Sub Judge or a Munsiff is to be preferred in the form of a memorandum signed by the appellant or his pleader to the District Judge of the Judicial district. Order 43 CPC provides for appeals from orders. Though the Order 43 CPC while enumerating the orders passed under various Provisions of the Code makes mention of an order under Order 7 Rule 10 CPC returning a plaint to be presented to the proper court, it does not make mention of an Order under 0rder 7 Rule 11 CPC rejecting the plaint. The reason is obvious and not difficult to figure out. The order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC in terms of Section 2 (2) CPC amounts to a decree and in terms of Order 43 CPC can be questioned through the medium of appeal before the Appellate Court in accordance with Section 34 of the Civil Courts Act 1920. In the present case the petitioner instead of questioning legality of the order impugned in revision petition through the medium of an appeal in terms of Order 41 CPC, has come up in revision before this Court. The petitioner obviously has chosen a wrong remedy and a wrong forum to question order of the Trial Court dated 22.11.2005, whereby his plaint has been rejected. The petitioner can not press into service the law laid down in 1998 SLJ 22 : (AIR 1998 J and K 73) and 2004 (2) SLJ 553, for the reason that the controversy raised in the reported cases related to revision from an order appealable under Order 43 CPC. It was held that an order otherwise appealable in terms of Order 43 CPC may well be assailed through medium of a revision petition before the High Court and any curtailment on the