1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent.

2. This petition challenges the legality and correctness of the order dated 01/08/2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur thereby setting aside the order dated 22/03/2016 passed by the Authorised Officer and Assistant Manager, Forest Development Corporation of Maharashtra Limited, Brahmapuri (hereinafter referred to as 'FDCM Limited' for short) directing confiscation of the seized vehicles, i.e. one tractor and one trolley bearing Registration Nos.MH-34/L/926 and MH-34//2309 respectively, on the ground that these two vehicles, belonging to respondent no.1, were used for illegal transportation of teak wood and other cut wood illegally obtained through illegal felling of teak and other trees in the forest of FDCM Limited, Bramhapuri.

3. There is an objection taken to the maintainability of this writ petition by the learned Counsel for respondent no.1. He has invited my attention to Section 61G of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Forest Act' for short), which lays down that any order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge hearing an appeal under Section 61D of the Forest Act shall be final and that no other Court, notwithstanding anything contained contrary in any law, shall have jurisdiction to make order with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of seized property including the seized vehicle. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that the bar of jurisdiction under Section 61G is not applicable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is extraordinary in it's nature and which is required to be exercised when a patent illegality is committed in passing the order by a judicial or quasi judicial authority. According to him, patent illegality as well as perversity both have been committed in the present case while passing the impugned order.

4. The objection as to the maintainability of this writ petition for its adjudication, in turn, depends on the answer that we would get on the issue as to whether or not any patent illegality or perversity has been committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing the impugned order. If this aspect of the case can be addressed and resolved properly, we would also have an answer ready made before us for deciding the question of maintainability or otherwise of the present writ petition.

5. It is well settled law that in order to exercise power of confiscation under Section 61A (Maharashtra amendment) of the Forest Act, it is necessary that there is a seizure of the vehicle used for commission of forest offence properly made and that the authorised officer is satisfied that there is a reason for him to believe that such an offence has been committed in respect of timber, sandalwood or any other notified forest-produce. It is also well settled law that the confiscation proceedings are separate and independent from the prosecution that may be instituted against the offender and that even if no prosecution has been initiated against the owner of the seized vehicle, the seized vehicle would be liable to confiscation if the two conditions just mentioned are fulfilled. It is equally well settled that if the owner is not to lose the vehicle by way of confiscation to the State, it would be essential for him to prove that the seized vehicle was used without his knowledge for committing the forest offence and that the standard of proof, required to be tendered by the owner, will not be the same as is required for proving a criminal offence. The law is that in order to discharge such a burden, which is placed upon the shoulder of the owner of the seized vehicle, the owner has to bring on record a reasonable probability of his not possessing the requisite knowledge. A useful reference in order to ascertain the settled position of law, as has been discussed now, could