The central legal point established in the judgment is the importance of addressing preliminary issues regarding the nature of employment before scrutinizing the merits of the controversy, as directed by previous judgments.

B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.

Heard Dr. Jamal, for the appellant and learned AGP for respondents 1 and 4. Nobody appears for respondent nos. 2, 3 and 5.

2. The judgment delivered by School Tribunal on 11.4.2001 dismissing Appeal No. STC 1/1997 preferred by present appellant-Tukaram, was questioned by him before the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 3887/2001. The learned single Judge has dismissed that petition on 7th December, 2009. These concurrent judgments are questioned in present Letters Patent Appeal.

3. Dr. Jamal contends that provisions contained in Section 7 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules,1981 (henceforth abbreviated to " the Act of 1977" and "the Rules of 1981" respectively) have been totally lost sight of. He relies upon the Division Bench judgment, in the case of Chandrakant Lone v. Chhatrapati Shivaji Education Society and others, reported at 1988 (1) CLR page 175, particularly paragraph 6 to submit that though provisions may be held to be directory, a substantial compliance therewith must be demonstrated. He submits that appellant-Tukaram was working in a granted school since 1991 and he has been orally terminated on 6.12.1996. This fact and legal implications flowing therefrom are totally ignored by School Tribunal as also by learned single Judge. He further submits that as appellant had put in about 6 years of service and was a permanent employee, resignation submitted by him (if any) ought to have been of duration of three months. Resignation of a shorter duration could have been accepted by management after demanding a proportionate amount for shortfall from appellant or then after deducting that amount from his dues, that is not the defence anywhere before School Tribunal. He further states that acceptance of alleged resignation by management on 7.12.1996 is not even pleaded in written statement before School Tribunal and hence finding, in that respect, is perverse.

4. He invites attention to police complaint lodged by Tukaram on 8.12.1996 and sequence of events disclosed therein, to show that from 5th December 1996 pressure was brought on Tukaram to complete registers/musters in a particular way and, for that purpose, he was even required to visit the residence of President of educational society. He submits that when he pointed out that information filled in was true and as per law, the President did not like it and he was threatened. According to him, in such atmosphere under coercion and putting Tukaram under fear of assault, resignation was obtained in a back date. He submits that complaint lodged to police officers on 8.12.1996 narrates all these facts but its cognizance has not been taken by School Tribunal. Learned counsel submits that mere non-mention of date "05.11.1996" as the date on which resignation was shown to have been obtained in police complaint, cannot be held to be fatal in present circumstances. He contends that thus there is total non-application of mind, not only by School Tribunal but also by learned single Judge to the relevant facts and hence the impugned judgments need to be quashed and set aside.

5. Learned AGP submits that Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981 also envisages a resignation with prior notice of one month. Material on record does not show that Tukaram was a permanent employee duly approved, regularly recruited and, therefore, he ought to have submitted the resignation three months in advance. She submits that learned single Judge has looked into the police complaint and found that grievance of asking an ante-dated resignation does not figure in. He further states that, in this situation, various judgments of this Court which comment upon scheme of Rule 40 and Section 7 have been looked into and thereafter a possible view has been reached. According to her, there is no jurisdictional error or perversity and hence Letters