S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J.

1. These writ petitions involve common questions of law and facts and were heard together. They can be disposed of conveniently by a common Judgment.

2. We issue rule in each of these petitions. The respondents have waived service. The contesting respondent is the KalyanDombivli Municipal Corporation whose Designated Officer has filed three affidavits in reply and each one of them are taken on record. Learned Senior Counsel arguing these petitions on behalf of the respective petitioners state, on instructions, that the petitioners do not wish to put any rejoinder but would proceed on denials.

3. The facts and circumstances in which we pass our ultimate order and direction would demonstrate as to how Public bodies have conducted themselves and in the recent past the tendencies on their part to defy the orders and directions of this Court have come to light even in these matters. In these matters we expected, and after a detailed hearing, the KalyanDombivli Municipal Corporation (“KDMC” for short) to take a reasonable stand and in the event there is an error and glaring in their orders and directions, they would be fair enough to state before the Court that such orders need not be upheld. They would take all the consequences of such orders being set aside but the powers be reserved unto them so as to proceed against the structures of the petitioners which stand demolished. To our utter shock and dismay, we find that far from accepting such glaring errors, the KDMC has instructed its Counsel to justify the actions and argue that there are absolutely no errors and no defiance in the least at all of the Order and Judgment of this Court.

4. Before we proceed further, we would invite the attention of all concerned to a Judgment of a Division Bench of this Court which has been rendered in the case of Sopan Maruti Thopte and another vs. Pune Municipal Corporation and another, reported in AIR 1996 Bom. 304, and decades back. In that Judgment and Order, this Court had an occasion to decide a group of petitions. The group of petitions dealt with the scheme of the provisions of Section 351 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888. The question referred for opinion and answer of the Division Bench was, whether it is obligatory on the Deputy Municipal Commissioner to give a personal or oral hearing to the parties after notice under Clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 351 is issued? Upon a common reference of such an issue, the Division Bench referred to the pari material provisions in the then Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949. Section 260 of the same and Section 351 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act are identical. This Court, firstly, negatived an argument on behalf of the petitioners in those petitions that in all eventualities a personal hearing would have to be given and there is no discretion in the Commissioner either to call for a written cause or to give personal hearing. After analysing the scheme of the Act and particularly the legal provisions, the Division Bench proceeded to hold that the principle of audi alteram partem is part and parcel of the principles of natural justice and the doctrine of hearing is not extended in every case. Requirement of natural justice cannot be an uniform mode and cannot be laid down on any straitjacket formula. It is, therefore, apparent that what principles of natural justice have to be followed is entirely to be decided from the scheme of the law and the peculiarity of the facts and circumstances. Therefore, no general rule can be laid down. In such circumstances, from the Judgment and Order of the Division Bench it is apparent that the Municipal Corporations in Maharashtra would follow this Judgment, and particularly the directions in paras 19, 20 and 21 thereof. Paras 19, 20 and 21 read as under:

“19. Hence, on the basis of the law as discussed above, it is directed that after 1st May, 1996 the Bombay Municipal Corporation or the Municip