2018 Supreme(Bom) 957
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT NAGPUR
A.S. Chandurkar, J.
Shobha Purushottam Zilpe – Appellant
Versus
Ramdas Dadaji Buradkar and Ors. – Respondents
Second Appeal No.522 of 2017
Decided On : 28-06-2018
Subject
Property Law - Hindu Succession Act
Act Referred
Headnote
Hindu Succession Act, 1952 - Section 6 - Share in suit property - Claim any share whatsoever in the suit property - Appellant is original plaintiff - She is daughter of one sister of defendant - It is her case that her father was having his self acquired property which was purchased out of his own labor - Defendants were in possession of those properties which included two shops and residential house - According to plaintiff she had share in suit property and she demanded same from defendants - As her share was not given plaintiff issued notice and thereafter filed suit for partition and separate possession – Held, It was observed that rights of plaintiffs therefore got cry stylized in year right to share co par canary property was upheld - Ratio aforesaid decision squarely applies to case in hand – In present suit has been filed which is after provisions Section of said Act came to be amended - In case before Honorable Supreme Court it can be seen that though suit was filed prior to Section being amended right of daughter in co par canary property has been recognized - In light of this law as laid down judgment of trial Court will have to be restored - Appellate Court did not have benefit judgment in alias supra and it proceeded on basis that as plaintiffs father had expired prior to provisions of Section being amended plaintiff was not entitled to any relief - As noted above that aspect has lost its relevance in view provisions of Section of said Act as amended and interpreted - In that view matter decision relied upon by counsel for respondent cannot be made applicable to case in hand - Right to co par canary property now having been recognized since birth aspect of plaintiff being married prior to year is therefore not found relevant – Appeal allowed
For the Appellant :Shri. S. C. Bhalerao, Advocate
For the Respondent:Shri. Y. N. Thengre, Advocate
In view of notice for final disposal issued earlier the learned counsel for the parties have been heard on the following substantial question of law :
“In the light of provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1952 prior to its amendment read with Section 8 of the said Act, whether the first appellate Court was legally justified in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not entitled for a share in the suit property ?”
2. The appellant is the original plaintiff. She is the daughter of one Dadaji and the sister of defendant No.1. It is her case that her father Dadaji was having his self acquired property which was purchased out of his own labour. The defendants were in possession of those properties which included two shops and a residential house. According to the plaintiff she had 1/3rd share in the suit property and she demanded the same from the defendants. As her share was not given, the plaintiff issued a notice and thereafter filed suit for partition and separate possession. In the written statement it was pleaded that the suit properties were ancestral in nature. The plaintiff had infact executed a relinquishment deed and had given up her right in the suit property. She was therefore not entitled for any relief whatsoever.
3. The trial Court recorded a finding that the suit property was the ancestral property of her father Dadaji. It was further held that the defendants had failed to prove execution of a relinquishment deed by the plaintiff. It then held that by virtue of provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act,1956 (for short, the said Act) as amended in the year 2005 she was entitled to a share in the suit property. The suit was accordingly partly decreed and the plaintiff was granted 1/9th share in the suit property.
The appellate Court however allowed the appeal filed by the defendants and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim any share whatsoever in the suit property. Being aggrieved the original plaintiff has filed the present appeal.
4. Shri S. S. Bhalerao, learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the trial Court had rightly interpreted the provisions of Section 6 of the said Act as amended. The plaintiff by virtue of that amendment, though a daughter was a coparcener and was therefore entitled to seek partition and also claimed a share in the properties of her father. According to him the law in this regard stands settled in view of the decisions in Danamma alias Suman Surpur and anr. vs. Amar and ors. 2018(3) Mh.L.J. 451 and Uttam vs. Saubhag Singh and ors. AIR 2016 SC 1169. He submitted that by virtue of the amended provisions the plaintiff had a right of a coparcener since birth. The appellate Court by misinterpreting those provisions refused to grant any relief to the plaintiff. It was therefore submitted that the judgment of the trial Court deserves to be restored.
5. Shri Y. N. Thengre, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 supported the impugned judgment. According to him since the father Dadaji had expired on 08/02/2004 and the plaintiff was married much prior to 1993 she was not entitled to any share in the suit property. According to him the appellate Court rightly referred to the provisions of Section 29A of the said Act as amended and applicable in the State of Maharashtra. The benefit of amended provisions of Section 6 of the said Act would also not be applicable to the plaintiff as their father expired much prior to the amended Act coming into force. In support of his submissions the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Kishore Morarji Bhojraj and anr. vs. Jaya Hiranchand Karani and ors. 2017(3) Mh. L.J. 909. He submitted that no interference was called for in the judgment of the appellate Court.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and I have given due consideration to their respective submissions. It is not in dispute that the suit property has been held to be ancestral property by both the Courts. The