JUDGMENT :

RAVINDRA V.GHUGE, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties.

2. The petitioners - original plaintiffs are aggrieved by the order dated 19.06.2019, passed by the trial Court by which Exhibit-28, filed by the plaintiffs, seeking permission to lead secondary evidence in Special Civil Suit No.331 of 2014, has been rejected.

3. The issue is as regards an "agreement to sell" dated 12.06.2014 (Isar Pavati). The plaintiffs have stated in their plaint that the said agreement to sell was signed between the parties and was notarised. It is admitted that the said document was not registered.

4. The defendants have submitted in paragraph no.26 of their Written Statement that such an "Isar Pavati" was actually executed on 12.06.2014. Similar admission is found specifically in paragraph no.6 of the plaint in RCS No.962 of 2014 filed by Bhimrao s/o Sandu Waghmare, who is defendant no.1 in the present suit.

5. The learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that on 19.09.2015, the trial Court allowed application Exhibit-19 filed by the plaintiffs seeking impounding of the notarised "Isar Pavati" dated 12.06.2014 under Section 34 of the Bombay Stamps Act (presently Maharashtra Stamps Act). The learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that as the learned Advocate dealing with the suit filed by the plaintiffs misplaced the notarised agreement to sell, the same could not be produced before the Court though, by an order dated 19.09.2015, Exhibit-19 was allowed by the trial Court and the plaintiffs were directed to produce the document for being forwarded to the Collector (Stamps).

6. He further concedes that the learned advocate representing the plaintiffs before the trial Court, after producing a photostat copy of the said document, should have called upon the defendants to admit or deny the said document, as is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the defendant- Bhimrao has admitted the document in the Written Statement and has also admitted this aspect in his own suit RCS No.962 of 2014, it would have been easy to deal with this issue of adducing secondary evidence in this matter. The trial Court has rejected application Exhibit-28 for the reason that this Court has directed that the suit be decided within a time frame up to 30.09.2019, by its order dated 04.12.2018 passed in W.P. No.1384 of 2017.

7. The learned Advocate for the plaintiffs relies upon the judgment delivered by this Court at the Principal Seat in the matter of Parasanbai Dhanraj Jain & others Vs. Sunanda Madhukar Jadhav, (2017) 6 AllMR 877, wherein it is concluded that no permission to lead secondary evidence is necessary. The Court cannot refuse such permission. No application to lead secondary evidence is required as the Court cannot insist on filing of an application for seeking such a permission. The learned Counsel submits that this order has been circulated to the entire subordinate judiciary in the State of Maharashtra.

8. I find that the plaintiffs in the case in hand have not properly assisted the trial Court. The defendant No.1 Bhimrao, in the present suit, has himself filed his own RCS No.962 of 2014 against the same plaintiffs and has specifically averred that an agreement to sell was prepared on 12.06.2014 and it is a notarised document.

9. The Counsel further submits that this Court, earlier has taken a view on 03.11.2017 in the case of Karthik Gangadhar Bhat Vs. Nirmala Namdeo Wagh & another, (2017) 6 AllMR 769 and in Parasanbai (supra) that the trial Courts have continued to persistently ignore settled law and binding precedents on the question of leading secondary evidence. It is held that, for the reasons that are entirely unclear, there seems to be an insistence on filing an application for permission to lead secondary evidence. This is simply wrong. No permission is required from the trial Court for leading secondary evidence. The trial Court cannot insist on making an application for such per