JUDGMENT :

AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.

1. Heard.

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. The matter is heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The present petition challenges the order dated 13.06.2018 passed by the executing Court in RD No. 38 of 2015, whereby the application filed by the decree-holder for issuance of warrant of possession in respect of the subject property, has been allowed, in light of the fact, that the sale deed of the subject property has already been executed and registered in favour of the decree-holder on 07.06.2018 consequent to a decree for specific performance dated 12.10.2010 passed in RCS No. 11 of 2008 (Old Spl. C.S. No. 239 of 1995), which decree has attained finality, the first appeal against the same being RCA No. 512 of 2010 having been dismissed on 05.07.2014 and thereafter Second Appeal No. 472 of 2016 also having been dismissed on 13.12.2016.

3. It is contended by Mr. Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioner that the decree in RCS No. 11/2008 dated 12.10.2010 did not contain any direction to deliver possession of the suit property. He further submits that such direction, was neither sought for, nor granted in the first appeal as well as the second appeal. He therefore, submits in absence of such a direction in the judgment and decree dated 12.10.2010 it was not permissible for the executing Court to have granted the application for issuance of warrant of possession of the suit property. He places reliance upon Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act and judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. vs. Daulat and Another, (2001) 7 SCC 698 and specifically Paras 16 and 17 to contend that in light of the language of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act 1963, in case the decree initially granted was not for possession, the relief for possession could only be obtained by way of an application under Section 22 (1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act. He further places reliance upon Sub section 2 of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, to contend that a prohibition is imposed in granting the relief of possession under Section 22(1)(a) unless it was specifically claimed. He therefore, submits that this having not been done it was not permissible for the executing Court to grant the application seeking warrant of possession. He therefore, submits that the impugned order clearly suffers from an illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.

4. Mr. Kuldeep Mahalle, learned counsel for the respondent decree-holder submits that, the agreement dated 25.01.1994 clearly contained a Clause for delivery of possession consequent to the execution and registration of the deed of sale and when specific performance of the agreement is sought and is granted, such grant of specific performance would inherently include the relief of possession also. It is submitted that the decree granted by the Court has to be understood in a wider sense in as much as, if possession is not held to be inherently included in the decree granting specific performance the decree would be rendered redundant. It is submitted that a Court does not pass redundant decree. It is further submitted that the Court is not denuded of its powers to render full justice to a party in whose favour relief has been granted and upheld by the higher Courts. He further invites my attention to the judgment of this Court in Kisan Shripat Patil vs. Ragho Vedu Patil, 2007 (4) Bom. C.R. 400 which takes into consideration, the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Adcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and goes on to hold, that it would be permissible for the executing Court to grant the relief of possession, even though the same has not been specifically granted in the decree, as doing so would result in granting appropriate, just and proper relief in favour of a person in whose favour a decree for specific performance is passed.

5. Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 being material is quoted as under:

“2