JUDGMENT

K.K. Tated, J. - By this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the Petitioner challenges the order dated 27.02.2018 passed by learned District Magistrate, Pune, under section 14(3) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002.

2. The main contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner is that alternate remedy is not provided against this order before DRT. In support of this contention he relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the matter of Harsh Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction Company Ltd. And Others, 2014 (4) Mah.L.J. 151. He relies on paragraph 22, 23 and 24 which reads thus:

"22. Subsection (3) of Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act provides that no act of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate or any officer authorised by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or District Magistrate done in pursuance of Section 14 shall be called in question in any court or before any authority. The SARFAESI Act, therefore, attaches finality to the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate and this decision cannot be challenged before any court or any authority. But this Court has repeatedly held that statutory provisions attaching finality to the decision of an authority excluding the power of any other authority or Court to examine such a decision will not be a bar for the High Court or this Court to exercise jurisdiction vested by the Constitution because a statutory provision cannot take away a power vested by the Constitution. To quote, the observations of this Court in Columbia Sportswear Company v. Director of Income Tax, Bangalore (2012) 11 SCC 224];

17. Considering the settled position of law that the powers of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and the powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution could not be affected by the provisions made in a statute by the Legislature making the decision of the tribunal final or conclusive, we hold that Rane Subsection (1) of Section 245S of the Act, insofar as, it makes the advance ruling of the Authority binding on the applicant, in respect of the transaction and on the Commissioner and incometax authorities subordinate to him, does not bar the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution or the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to entertain a challenge to the advance ruling of the Authority. In our view, therefore, the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate can be challenged before the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by any aggrieved party and if such a challenge is made, the High Court can examine the decision of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, in accordance with the settled principles of law.

23. We may next consider whether a lessee has any remedy by way of an appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act when the secured creditor attempts to take over possession of the secured asset which is in possession of the lessee. Subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act are extracted hereinbelow:

17. Right to appeal.( 1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Subsection (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application alongwith such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower.

Explanation. For the removal of doubts, it is hereby Rane declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having