The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction over matters determined by the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal under the Securitisation Act, and claims of tenancy and equitable lease did not provide grounds for relief in the Civil Court.

JUDGMENT

Dama Seshadri Naidu, J. - The appellant claims to be a tenant. The first respondent is the Board of Directors of the second respondent Bank; the third respondent, the authorised officer, that is the Assistant General Manager of the Bank; and the fourth respondent, according to the Bank, does not exist.

2. To ascertain the identity of the fourth respondent, I have asked the learned counsel for the appellant. She has then consulted the appellant present in the Court. He too has said he has no idea.

3. The fifth and sixth respondents are the borrowers. The seventh respondent is the District Magistrate; the eighth respondent is the Mamlatdar; and the ninth respondent, the SI of Police.

4. As narrated by both the learned counsel, the fifth and sixth respondents borrowed the money in 2008 and later defaulted in repaying it. So the Bank has approached the DRT to recover that money, and those proceedings are said to be pending. Pending those proceedings, the Bank invoked the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002 ("the Securitisation Act"). It issued notice under Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. It was on 24.11.2016.

5. To the Bank''s notice under Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, the fifth and sixth respondents, that is the borrowers, did not respond. Then, the Bank invoked Section 14 and approached the District Magistrate for taking possession of the secured asset. In turn, on 25.07.2017, the District Magistrate passed an order, requiring the Mamlatdar to take possession of the secured asset, with the help of the police, and deliver it to the Bank.

6. In tune with the District Magistrate''s order, on 08.09.2017, the Mamlatdar and the Bank officials, along with the police, are said to have gone to the secured asset. Then, the borrowers, as the Bank''s counsel maintains, informed the Mamlatdar and others that "a case was filed", though they did not provide the details. Therefore, the Mamlatdar and the Bank Officials returned.

7. Later, the Bank received the summons in Civil Suit No.23/2017 from Fast Track Court II, Margao. In fact, the appellant claimed to be the tenant. He questioned the Bank''s efforts to dispossess him. On the date of the first hearing, the Bank filed its written statement, besides filing a reply in the appellant''s interlocutory application for stay. That apart, the Bank also applied under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, requiring the trial Court to reject the plaint because it revealed no cause of action and the suit is barred by law, too.

8. Initially, the trial Court granted no stay but later, according to the Bank''s counsel, the appellant mentioned the matter out of turn without notice to the Bank and secured an ex parte stay. It was on 21.02.2018. Eventually, the Trial Court rejected the plaint on 11.01.2019. The rejection was on the premise that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction and that the plaint revealed no cause of action. Aggrieved, the appellant has filed this First Appeal.

Submissions:

Appellant:

9. Ms. Maria Nedumpara, the learned counsel for the appellant, advanced the arguments. At that stage, I queried with the advocate whether she had the wakalatnama; then, she submitted that though she had no wakalatnama she was willing to file one. So I permitted her to file wakalatnama signed by the appellant, who is present in the Court. The wakalatnama filed, the learned counsel has resumed her submissions.

10. Ms. Maria Nedumpara has submitted that Section 17 (4) of the Securitisation Act sets out the grounds of tenancy that could be considered by the DRT. But here the tenant has raised larger issues which could not be decided by the Tribunal. Therefore, it is unexceptionable that the appellant has approached the Civil Court, which alone could grant the relief the appellant has sought. In other words, Ms. Nedumpara has insisted that the Civil Court does have jurisdiction.

11. To elaborate, Ms. Nedumpara has also contended that ten