The main legal point established was that prima facie evidence of caste-based abuse is essential to establish the offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act.

JUDGMENT :

1. Admit.

2. Present appeal has been filed under Section 14-A (2) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Atrocities Act’) to challenge the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge / Special Judge, Parbhani in Criminal Miscellaneous (Bail) Application No.645 of 2020 dated 07-08-2020. The present appellant is apprehending her arrest in Crime No.154 of 2020 dated 27-07-2020 registered with Parbhani (Rural) Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 324, 323, 504, 34 of Indian Penal Code and under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act. She had approached the Special Judge for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, the said application has been rejected. Present respondent No.2 has lodged the First Information Report.

3. Heard learned Advocate Mr. S. J. Salunke for appellant, learned APP Mr. S. W. Munde for respondent No.1-State and learned Advocate Ms. Sheetal Salunke for respondent No.2 (appointed).

4. It will not be out of place to mention here that when the matter was on board on 03-09-2020, at that time, respondent No.2 – informant had not appeared, though served. Under such circumstance, this Court had appointed Ms. Sheetal Salunke to represent the cause of respondent No.2. But, thereafter, learned Advocate Mr. S. D. Kamble filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of respondent No.2, however, he was absent when the matter was finally heard on 15-09-2020 and therefore, submissions on behalf of appointed Advocate have been heard for respondent No.2.

5. It has been vehemently submitted on behalf of the appellant that perusal of FIR would show that informant was not present when the alleged incident had taken place at about 3.00 p.m. on 26-07-2020. It is stated that there was quarrel between the present appellant and the daughters of the informant. But thereafter it is stated in the FIR that informant was informed about the incident, so also, after the return of the wife of the informant, at that time, again the present appellant went in the courtyard of the informant and started abusing them. When the informant was trying to advise the appellant, the appellant’s husband and one Gaju Shankar Kharwade went there and they had assaulted the wife of the informant by stick on her head. It had resulted bleeding injury to the wife of the informant. Gaju had then assaulted informant on his right hand by stick resulting in covert injury. Present appellant had caused covert injury to the daughter of the informant. After hearing the voice, people gathered and separated them. All these recitals would show that there was no abuses in the name of caste. It is only stated in the FIR that since the informant and his family members are the members of Scheduled Caste, they have been assaulted. The FIR itself contends that the incident had triggered due to the dispute between small children and under such circumstance, it could not have been the intention that only because the informant belongs to a particular caste, he and his family members would have been assaulted. Offence under Section 3(2)(va) of the Atrocities Act is not made out and therefore, there was no question of bar under Section 18 of the said Act for entertaining a pre-arrest bail. The learned Special Judge has not taken into consideration all these aspects and even not considered the ratio laid down in Prathvi Raj Chauhan Vs. Union of India and others [WP (C) No.1015 of 2018] delivered by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 10-02-2020. As regards the present appellant is concerned, at the most, the offences under Indian Penal Code would be under Sections 323 and 504 of Indian Penal Code, which are bailable. Further, the husband of the present appellant and said Gaju were arrested and they have been released on regular bail by the learned Special Judge. Under such circumstance, the physical custody of the appellant is not at all required for the purpose o