2022 Supreme(Bom) 543
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY BENCH AT AURANGABAD
RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
Dhannu Bhagu Rathod - Petitioner
Versus
Sarpanch, Grampanchayat Office & Another - Respondents
Writ Petition No. 5035 of 2019
Decided On : 09-03-2022
For the Petitioner: Shri S. Shelke Avishkar.
For the Respondents: Shri R. Lukhe Arjun.
Headnote:
i.D. Act, 1957 - Section 11(9) and (10) or 29 - Code of Civil Procedure,1908 - Order 21 - Seeking implementation of award - Termination - Challenged - Petitioner had approached Labour Court in Reference (IDA) No.2/2015 for challenging his termination - By judgment and award dated reference was answered in affirmative and petitioner was granted reinstatement with continuity and 50% back wages - As award was not implemented, petitioner approached Industrial Court under Item 9 of Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 alleging that failure on part of employer in implementing settlement, agreement or award, would amount to unfair labour practice - Industrial Court has concluded that as petitioner had initially approached Labour Court for challenging his termination, he could invoke jurisdiction under Section 11(9) and (10) or under Section 29 of I.D. Act, 1957 - No doubt, sub-section (9) of Section 11 does render a remedy available to employee to seek execution of award by treating same as a decree delivered by Civil Court under Order 21 of Code of Civil Procedure - Section 29 is not a remedy - Section 29 is only as regards penalty, which is prescribed for breach of settlement or award – Held, While Corporation cannot simultaneously pursue two remedies, it is under no disability to take recourse to rights and remedy available to it under Section 29 of Act even after an order under Section 31 has been obtained but without executing it and withdrawing from those proceedings at any stage - Use of expression "without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29 of Act" in Section 31 cannot be read to mean that Corporation after obtaining a final order under Section 31 of Act from a court of competent jurisdiction, is denuded of its rights under Section 29 of Act - To hold so would render above-quoted expression redundant in Section 31 of Act and courts do not lean in favour of rendering words used by Legislature in statutory provisions redundant - Corporation which has right to make choice may make choice initially whether to proceed under Section 29 of Act or Section 31 of Act, but its rights under Section 29 of Act are not extinguished, if it decides to take recourse to provisions of Section 31 of Act - It can abandon proceedings - Writ Petition is allowed.
JUDGMENT :
1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties.
2. By this Writ Petition, the petitioner seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 09.10.2018 delivered by the Industrial Court, Jalna, vide which, Complaint (ULP) No.298/2016 filed by the petitioner under Item 9 of the Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971, seeking implementation of the award delivered by the Labour Court in the reference case has been held to be untenable on the ground of bar of Section 59.
3. The petitioner had approached the Labour Court in Reference (IDA) No.2/2015 for challenging his termination. By the judgment and award dated 11.02.2016, the reference was answered in the affirmative and the petitioner was granted reinstatement with continuity and 50% back wages. As the award was not implemented, the petitioner approached the Industrial Court under Item 9 of the Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 alleging that failure on the part of the employer in implementing the settlement, agreement or award, would amount to unfair labour practice. The Industrial Court has concluded that as the petitioner had initially approached the Labour Court for challenging his termination, he could invoke the jurisdiction under Section 11(9) and (10) or under Section 29 of the I.D. Act, 1957.
4. No doubt, sub-section (9) of Section 11 does render a remedy available to the employee to seek execution of the award by treating the same as a decree delivered by the Civil Court under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, Section 29 is not a remedy. Section 29 is only as regards penalty, which is prescribed for breach of settlement or award. Be that as it may, Item 9 of the Schedule IV is also an effective remedy available to the employee to seek implementation of the award or settlement or agreement and such award can be got executed by preferring a ULP complaint. The doctrine of election can, therefore, be made applicable permitting the employee to choose one of the two remedies when both are available to him.
5. On the Doctrine of Election, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held in A.P. State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s GAR Re-Rolling Mills and another, [AIR 1994 SC 2151 = 1994 AIR SCW 1953], in paragraph Nos.13, 15 and 16 as under:-
“13. On a conjoint reading of Sections 29 and 31 of the Act, it appears to us that in case of default in repayment of loan or any instalment or any advance or breach of an agreement, the Corporation has two remedies available to it against the defaulting industrial concern, one under Section 29 and another under Section 31 of the Act. The choice for availing the remedy under Section 29 or Section 31 of the Act is that of the Financial Corporation alone and the defaulting concern has no say whatsoever in the matter, as to which remedy should be taken recourse to by the Corporation against it for effecting the recovery. The expression "without prejudice to the provisions of Section 29 of this Act” as appearing in Section 31 of the Act clearly demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to confine the Corporation to take recourse to only a particular remedy against the defaulting industrial concern for recovery of the amount due to it. It left the choice to the Corporation to act in the first instance under Section 31 of the Act and save its rights and remedies under Section 29 of the Act to be availed at a later stage, with the sole object of enabling the Corporation to recover its dues. It is not, however, obligatory on the part of the Financial Corporation to invoke the special provisions of Section 31 of the Act, it can even without taking recourse to the provisions of the said section invoke the procedure prescribed under Section 29 of the Act for realisation of its dues. Where the Corporation takes recourse to the provisions of Section 31 of the Act and obtains an order from the court, it shall ordinarily and invariably seek its enforcement in the manner provided by S