JUDGMENT

DESAI, J.:— This appeal by special leave raises a narrow but interesting question on the nature of proceedings under Ss. 31 and 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (Act for short) which has a direct impact on the question of court-fees to be paid on an application that may be made under S. 31 of the Act. The question arose in the context of the following facts :

2. The State of Gujarat set up the Gujarat State Financial Corporation (Corporation for short), the appellant herein, under S. 3 of the Act. The Corporation was set up inter alia for granting or guaranteeing the loans to be raised by industrial concerns either from scheduled banks or State Co-operative banks or those floated in the public market. The Corporation guaranteed numerous such loans, advanced to the industrial concerns in the State of Gujarat on certain terms and conditions agreed between the parties. When the industrial concern defaults in repayment of loan or fails to comply with the terms of the agreement the Corporation is entitled to make an application to the District Judge within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on the whole or substantial part of its business for one or more of the reliefs set out in S. 31 (1) of the Act. The Corporation appears to have made applications purporting to be under . 31 (1) of the Act in various District Courts in the State of Gujarat against different industrial concerns. A question was raised in the District Courts about the proper court-fee payable on such applications. The Corporation contended that the application would be governed by Art. 1 (c) of Sch. II of the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, and a fixed court-fee in the amount of 65 paise would be payable in respect of the application. On the other hand, the state contended that the application would be governed either by Art. I of Sch. I or at any rate by Article 7 of Sch. I and the court-fee payable would be ad valorem on the amount of value of the subject-matter in dispute or on the amount of the monetary gain or loss to be prevented according to the scale prescribed under Art. I of Sch. I. It appears that except for the Distt. Judge, Broach, all other District Judges accepted the contention on behalf of the State. The Distt. Judge, Broach was of the opinion that the application under S. 31 (1) was in the nature of an execution application and it would be governed by Art. 1 (c) of Sch. II. The Corporation preferred revision applications to the High Court questioning the correctness of the decisions directing levy of ad valorem court-fee. The State of Gujarat also preferred a revision application against the decision of the Distt. Judge, Broach holding that the application under S. 31 (1) of the Act was in the nature of an execution application. The High Court by a common judgment held that the application under S. 31 (1) should bear ad valorem court-fee. In reaching this conclusion the High Court treated the application under S. 31 (1) of the Act on par with a suit by a mortgagee to enforce the mortgage debt by sale of the mortgaged property which is being treated as a money suit falling within the purview of Art. I of Sch. I. Alternatively, it was held that even if the application under S. 31 (1) is not a plaint within the meaning of Art. 1 of the Sch. I, it would fall within the purview of Art. 7 of Sch. I which provides an ad valorem court-fee on an application made for obtaining substantive relief which is capable of being valued in terms of monetary gain or prevention of monetary loss because to all intents and purposes the application is one for recovery of the outstanding claim of the Corporation. In accordance with these findings the revision applications preferred by the Corporation were dismissed and the one preferred by the State was allowed.

3. Mr. Sorabji, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant Corporation contended that the view taken by the learned Judge of the High Court that on an analogy t