The possession of the licensee was not lawful after the expiration of the lease, and the court relied on Rule 152 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 and the decision in C. Albert Morris to make its decision.

JUDGMENT :

Rohit B. Deo, J.

Heard.

2. The petitioner is assailing the order dated 1.11.2022, passed by respondent 3 – Joint Chief Controller of Explosives, refusing to suspend or cancel the license for storing, selling or carrying out business in petroleum, diesel and allied products and services issued to respondent 1.

3. Factual matrix :

3.1) Petitioner is the owner of plot 190, CTS 854, Mouza Harpur which is situated in Ayurved Layout, South Ridge Road, Nagpur admeasuring 6000 Sq.Ft. in area (subject plot).

3.2) Respondent 1 – Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL) is a government company registered under the Companies Act, 1956.

3.3) The subject plot was leased in favour of respondent 1 for storing, selling or carrying out business in petroleum, diesel and allied products and services vide registered deed of lease dated 30.4.2004.

3.4) The lease tenure of 11 years and 6 months expired on 29.10.2015.

3.5) Respondent 1 did not vacate the subject plot and the petitioner issued quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TP Act”) on 10.12.2015. The notice went unheeded and the petitioner instituted Regular Civil Suit 30/2016 inter alia seeking decree of eviction, which suit is pending.

3.6) During the pendency of Regular Civil Suit 30/2016, respondents 1 and 2 instituted Special Civil Suit 664/2017, seeking specific performance of the condition of renewal of lease and in the alternate, compensation and damages.

3.7) The petitioner contends that during the pendency of Regular Civil Suit 30/2016, he came across Circular dated 4.1.2012, issued by the Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organization (PESO) which articulates that litigious possession is not a legal possession. On 24.11.2018, the petitioner preferred an application to the concerned department seeking details of the license issued to respondents 1 and 2. In response, the petitioner received communication dated 11.12.2018 alongwith which was enclosed copy of the license dated 30.4.2004.

3.8) The petitioner addressed communication dated 31.12.2018 informing the respondent 3 that the lease had expired and suit for eviction is pending. Since no action was taken by the respondent 3, the petitioner approached the High Court in Writ Petition 7629/2009. The High Court partly allowed the Writ Petition vide order dated 11.12.2020 and directed respondent 3 to decide the representation of the petitioner within stipulated period. In view of the order of the High Court supra, respondent 3 passed order dated 6.1.2021 informing the petitioner that the license issued in favour of respondent 1 cannot be suspended or cancelled.

3.9) Petitioner assailed the communication-cum-order dated 6.1.2021 in Writ Petition 2771/2021, which was disposed of vide order dated 11.8.2022. The High Court directed respondent 3 to consider the application preferred by respondent 1 seeking renewal of license, afresh. The petitioner preferred review application which was disposed of by the High Court observing that the grounds in review application can be urged in the proceedings post remand.

3.10) As noted supra, by order impugned, respondent 3 has refused to suspend or cancel the license observing that the issue will be revisited after the decision in Civil Suit 664/2017 instituted for decree of specific performance of the condition of renewal.

4. Submission of behalf of petitioner:

4.1) The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. R.M. Sharma heavily relies on the decision of the Apex Court in C. Albert Morris vs. K. Chandrasekaran and Others, (2006)1 SCC 228 (“C. Albert Morris”) which considers Rule 152(1)(i) of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 (“Petroleum Rules”), to buttress the submission that in view of the irrefutable position on record that the lease expired on 29.10.2015, respondents ceased to have right to the site, and in view of unambiguous statutory provisions, the respondent 3 was obligated to issue order of suspension or cancellation.

4.2) Mr. R.M. Sharma would submit that even if it is assumed a