IMPORTANT POINT
The distinction between ordinary violence and exceptional violence is critical in determining eligibility for premature release under the guidelines, and the trial court's findings must be factually tenable to be binding.

JUDGMENT/ORDER

MANGESH S.PATIL,J. - Heard.

2. In this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is seeking premature release under sec. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure pursuant to the guidelines framed by the State Government under Sec. 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

3. The petitioner with other accused has been convicted for murder of his wife Kalpana on account of dowry and was sentenced to life imprisonment under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code. He has undergone 16 years of actual imprisonment and with inclusion of remission it would constitute 24 years of imprisonment.

4. The petitioner claims that considering the guidelines framed by the State government under Sec. 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure taking into consideration the circumstances in which he has been found guilty of committing murder, his case has been placed in category 1(E) of the guidelines of the year 1992 which is corresponding to category no. 2(c) of the guidelines of 2010. He ought to have been placed in category no. 2(b) of the guidelines of 2010 which prescribe punishment of 24 years.

5. Learned advocate Mr. Jaiswal would take us through the judgment of the trial Court whereby the petitioner was convicted and submitted that there was nothing before the trial Court to demonstrate that the crime was committed with exceptional violence or brutality. She had died of asphyxia due to drowning and in the peculiar circumstances, the trial Court concluded that it was doubtful if she was first killed and immediately thrown or was simply beaten and was thrown in the well. He would advert our attention to the evidence of the Medical Officer Dr. Vasant Karande who was examined as prosecution witness no. 1. He would submit that though the report submitted by the trial Court under Sec. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mentions that the crime was committed with exceptional violence and/or brutality, the report does not take into consideration the entire judgment of the trial Court. He would submit that in every crime there would be some violence but that would not necessarily make it an exceptional violence. In order to distinguish the two he places reliance on the observations of this Court in the matter of Rajaram Patil v. State of Maharashtra; 1997 (99) Bom.L.R. 98.

6. Per contra, the learned APP referring to the affidavit-inreply supports the decision placing the petitioner in category 2(c) of the government guidelines of 2010.

7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the papers.

8. In view of the Full Bench decision of this Court in the matter of Yovehel Vijaykumar Gouri Vs. State of Maharashtra and others; 2020 (6) Mh.L.J. 571 any opinion expressed by the Presiding Judge of the trial Court under Sec. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is binding on the authorities. Consequently, when the trial Court in its report submitted under Sec. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has expressly stated that the crime was caused with exceptional violence, obviously, the respondents were legally bound to obey such observation. However, that will not denude this Court the power of examining the correctness of the view expressed under sec. 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

9. In the report submitted by the Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik dtd. 27/12/2016 it has been mentioned that the deceased - Kalpana was subjected to ill-treatment on account of their demand for money, she was repeatedly assaulted causing injuries on her person and was killed by drowning into the well and would constitute the dowry death. It was committed within three months of the marriage. It is for this reason that the report submits that the petitioner could be appropriately placed in category no. 2(c) of the Government guidelines dtd. 15/3/2010 and liable to suffer actual imprisonment for 26 years.

10. It is necessary to note that considering the evidence before the trial Court, the Judge who rendered the convic