IMPORTANT POINT
Entitlement to a regular time scale for employees is conditional upon selection by a competent committee and the availability of vacancies, rather than being automatic after a specified period of service.

JUDGMENT/ORDER

1. Heard Mr. Kedar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Jagdale, learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The petition challenges the judgment dtd. 6/1/2014 passed by the learned Industrial Court, Nagpur, declaring that the respondent/complainant is entitled to the benefit of difference between temporary time scale and regular time scale, on completion of 180 days with consequential benefits. In the instant case, it is not disputed by Mr. Jagdale, learned counsel for the respondent, that the respondent/complainant had completed 180 days on 22/11/1991, though the date 22/11/1990 is stated in the complaint and the impugned judgment, which according to him is incorrect, the correct date being 22/11/1991.

3. Mr. Kedar, learned counsel for the petitioner contends, that in view of the Settlement of the year 1985 and the Circular dtd. 6/2/2009 which was issued in pursuance to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Premlal, 2007 (113) FLR 451, the respondents, were entitled to the regular time scale, from the date of their selection by the Selection Committee and a vacant post being available, and not on the date of completion of 180 days.

4. Mr. Kedar, learned counsel for the petitioner further submits, that the respondent was put on regular time scale with effect from 1/10/1995, which would indicate that it is at that point of time the selection of respondent was made by the Selection Committee on a regular vacancy being in existence, and therefore, the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of regular time scale immediately on completion of 180 days i.e., from 22/11/1991.

5. Mr. Jagdale, learned counsel for the respondent submits, that immediately on completion of 180 days, the respondent/complainant is entitled to the regular time scale and not otherwise, and therefore, supports the impugned judgment.

6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Premlal (supra), has categorically held, that the entitlement of all benefits admissible to a regular employee working in MSRTC would be admissible, subject to the eligibility criteria of having worked for aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms of the Resolution No. 8856 read with Clause 19 of the 1985 settlement. It is therefore apparent, that an employee is not automatically entitled for regular time scale on completion of 180 days as the entitlement is clearly subject to the satisfaction of the conditions prescribed in Resolution No. 8856 read with Clause 19 of the Settlement of 1985. Clause 19 (i) of the Settlement of 1985, as quoted in para 6 (page 22) of the complaint itself indicates, that the absorption of the daily rated workman after completion of service of 180 days, would be subject to selection by the Competent Committee and availability of vacancies.

7. This would clearly indicate, that the grant of regular time scale is not automatic on the completion of 180 days but it would be subject to selection by the committee and availability of vacancies. In the instant case, it is not disputed by Mr. Jagdale, learned counsel for the respondent, that the regular time scale was applicable to the respondent on 1/10/1995, which would indicate, that it is on this date the requirement of Clause 19(i) of the Settlement of 1985 stood complied with. This being the position, the respondent /complainant was entitled to the regular time scale only from 1/10/1995 and not otherwise. The impugned judgment of the learned Industrial Court, Nagpur which grants him the benefit of the regular time scale automatically on completion of 180 days, is therefore clearly contrary to what has been held in Premlal (supra) as well as Clause 19 (i) of the Settlement of 1985 and so also Clause 4 of the Circular dtd. 6/2/2009 which is in consonance with what has been stated above. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed and set a