IMPORTANT POINT
Compliance with statutory notice requirements under Sec. 115 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is essential for the maintainability of a suit against the Trust, regardless of claims of arbitrary action.

JUDGMENT/ORDER

M.S.JAWALKAR, J. - Heard learned Counsel for the appellant.

2. The present appeal is filed by the appellant being aggrieved by the Judgment and order dtd. 20/02/2006 passed by 7thAdhoc Additional District Judge, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No.83/1999 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant/original defendant against the judgment and decree dtd. 31/12/1998 passed by 2ndJoint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Nagpur in Regular Civil Suit No.2430/1994.

3. This Court on 21/07/2008 has admitted the present appeal on following substantial questions of law:

"i) Whether the Courts could have recorded a finding that the notice dtd. 07/12/1994 was illegal and arbitrary without considering the admission of the plaintiff in his cross-examination that the demand notices were received by the plaintiff but, he had not deposited the license fee in spite of the same?

ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Courts could have held that the suit was not bad for absence of notice under Sec. 115 of the N.I.T. Act?"

4. The case of the Plaintiff is as under:

The plaintiff/respondent is the lessee of Plot No.4981 in the Industrial Basti Scheme at Nagpur since 05/12/1977 on permanent basis. The defendant/appellant had given the same to her in the public auction at Rs.75.00 p.m. The appellant put her in possession of the same in the year 1978. However, some of the officials of the appellants are influenced by some other person and therefore, they are not accepting the amount of rent from her inspite of the efforts made by her. The appellant threatened her by issuing notices that she would be dispossessed from the building. Accordingly the appellant issued the notice dtd. 07/12/1994 calling upon her to vacate the suit plot, which she received on 14/12/1994. After receiving notice on 14/12/1994, she went to the office of the appellant but the cashier refused to accept the amount mentioned in the notice. She claimed the declaration that the notice issued by the appellant is null and void and the appellant has no right to evict her from the suit plot without following the process of law and for perpetual injunction against the appellant restraining him from interfering in her possession.

5. The appellant NIT has come with the case that inspite of repeated demands and notices having been issued to the respondent, she has not paid amount of the license fee since the year 1987. Therefore, show cause notice dtd. 04/10/1989 was issued to her as to why her allotment of the suit plot to her should not be cancelled. Thereafter, reminders were issued on 20/04/1990 and 11/01/1991. Inspite of that, she did not comply with the notice and did not comply the terms and conditions of the allotment which she had accepted. Therefore, her license was cancelled w.e.f. 13/08/1991. Even thereafter she did not vacate the suit plot. Hence the notice dtd. 07/12/1994 was issued to her. The suit plot was allotted to her for running the business of fire wood stall. However, she has changed the user and has erected the chawl and leased out the same on rent to various person. Therefore, the allotment of the suit in her favour has ben cancelled by the notice dtd. 07/12/1994. The learned Trial Court after framing the issues and recording the evidence decreed the suit. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the defendant had filed RCA No.83/1999 before the learned Appellate Court and the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal. The above said judgment and decree is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal.

6. The learned Counsel for appellant contended that the learned Courts below failed to see that the appellant had not executed any lease in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. Even the license given to the respondent/plaintiff was not by any registered document. The license was in respect of an open land which was required to be used only for a specific purpose of running a fire wood stall. The respondent/plaintiff had not only breached