The acceptance of a nomination paper must adhere to statutory provisions, and disqualification under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act is self-operative, allowing for judicial intervention in cases of glaring illegality.

JUDGMENT:

1. By way of the present Writ Petition preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the legality, validity, and propriety of the order dated 17th March 2025 passed by respondent No.2 in Appeal No.12 of 2025, whereby the said authority, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction conferred under Section 152A of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (for short, “the MCS Act”), has been pleased to allow the appeal preferred by respondent No.5. The said appeal had been preferred by respondent No.5 assailing the rejection of his nomination for election to the Managing Committee of respondent No.3-Society, inter alia, on the ground that as on the date of scrutiny of nominations, i.e., 6th March 2025, respondent No.5 stood as a defaulter of a cooperative bank and was, therefore, disqualified to contest the said election.

2. The factual matrix giving rise to the filing of the present petition is succinctly set out hereunder:

Respondent No.1, in its capacity as the competent authority, published an election programme for conducting the election to the Managing Committee of respondent No.4-Society. As per the said programme, the last date for filing nomination papers was fixed as 5th March 2025; the scrutiny of nomination papers was scheduled for 6th March 2025, and the final list of validly nominated candidates was to be published on 7th March 2025.

3. In pursuance of the said election programme, both the petitioner and respondent No.5 submitted their respective nomination papers for contesting the election to the Managing Committee of respondent No.4. However, the petitioner raised an objection to the nomination of respondent No.5, contending that respondent No.5 was disqualified from contesting the election as he was a defaulter in respect of a loan obtained from Karad Urban Cooperative Bank. The said objection was lodged by the petitioner on 6th March 2025, i.e., the date of scrutiny. In response to the said objection, respondent No.5 submitted a written reply, inter alia contending that the objection was politically motivated; that reliance placed upon a newspaper report to establish default was untenable in law; and that the petitioner had failed to produce any certificate of default from the Karad Urban Cooperative Bank or any notice issued by the said Bank calling upon respondent No.5 to repay the outstanding dues. It was the specific case of respondent No.5 that he was not a defaulter and hence, not disqualified from contesting the election.

4. Upon considering the objection raised by the petitioner as well as the reply submitted by respondent No.5, and after affording an opportunity of hearing to both parties, respondent No.3, by a reasoned order dated 6th March 2025, upheld the objection raised by the petitioner and rejected the nomination of respondent No.5. The said decision was founded upon the proceedings initiated by Karad Urban Cooperative Bank under the provisions of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, “the SARFAESI Act”).

5. Aggrieved by the rejection of his nomination, respondent No.5 preferred an appeal under Section 152A of the MCS Act on 10th March 2025. The petitioner entered appearance in the said appeal and filed a reply opposing the same. Respondent No.2, upon hearing both sides and considering the material on record, was pleased to allow the said appeal by order dated 17th March 2025. In doing so, respondent No.2 observed that reliance placed on the newspaper publication regarding initiation of proceedings under the SARFAESI Act could not be treated as admissible evidence. Further, respondent No.2 found that no documentary material had been placed on record to establish that any notice had been issued by Karad Urban Cooperative Bank to respondent No.5 for recovery of any outstanding dues. Consequently, the appellate authority set aside the order of rejection and allowed the nom