SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2025 Supreme(Bom) 844

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
SOMASEKHAR SUNDARESAN, J.
Priyanka Communications India Pvt - Petitioner
Versus
Tata Capital Limited - Respondent
Commercial Arbitration Petition No. 97 of 2025
Decided On : 04-02-2025

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant Mr. Atul Damle, Senior Advocate a/w. Premlal Krishnan, Nadeem Shama, Rehmat Lokhandwala, Hrishikesh Nadkarni and Siddharth Seshadri i/b PAN India Legal Services LLP, for Petitioner.
For the Respondent:Rohan Savant a/w. Mr. Mayur Bhojwani, Mr. Aauam Mehta i/b Manilal Kher Ambabal & Co, for Respondent

Past representations of an arbitrator do not constitute current representation, thus not attracting disqualification under the Seventh Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

Headnote:

(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 12, 13, and 14 - Petition to set aside an order of the Sole Arbitrator for not recusing himself - The Petitioner alleged conflicts due to past representations, invoking the Fifth Schedule for doubts on independence - Court clarified that only de jure or de facto inability under Section 14(1)(a) allows for substitution of an arbitrator - The arbitrator did not meet ineligibility conditions under the Seventh Schedule. (Paras 1-12)

(B) Independence and Impartiality - The court emphasized that past representations do not constitute current representation, thus not attracting disqualification under the Seventh Schedule. (Paras 6-11)

Facts of the case:
The Petitioner sought to challenge the Sole Arbitrator's refusal to recuse himself based on alleged conflicts arising from past representations with affiliates of the Respondent.

Findings of Court:
The court found that the Sole Arbitrator did not meet the criteria for disqualification and that the Petition lacked merit.

Issues: The main issues were whether the Sole Arbitrator was de jure or de facto unable to perform his duties and whether past representations warranted recusal.

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that past representations do not equate to current representation, and the criteria for disqualification under the Seventh Schedule were not met.

Result: Petition dismissed.

JUDGMENT :

1. This is a Petition filed invoking Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the Act”), requesting this Court to set aside an order dated November 11, 2024, by which, the Learned Sole Arbitrator, (appointed by an order of this Court under Section 11 of the Act on October15, 2024) has not recused himself at the request of the Petitioner.

2. The material on record brought to bear by the Petitioner, essentially covers the disclosure made by the Learned Sole Arbitrator on November 11, 2024, setting out the nature of relationships between the Learned Sole Arbitrator with affiliates of the Respondent. These disclosures are essentially about a few matters where the Learned Sole Arbitrator had represented some affiliates of the Respondent. The Petitioner has also brought to bear a range of other past representations, which would lead to the factual matrix that would enable the Petitioner to invoke the Fifth Schedule of the Act i.e. to raise justifiable doubts as to independence and impartiality of the arbitrator. The Petitioner filed an application under Section 13 of the Act requesting the Learned Sole Arbitrator to recuse from the proceedings. The Learned Sole Arbitrator rejected the application.

3. This Petition seeks that the Court should substitute the Learned Sole Arbitrator on the premise that the arbitrator is conflicted. However, one would need to have specific regard to the scope of jurisdiction of this Court. Section 14(1)(a) of the Act inter alia enables this Court to interfere during the course of arbitral proceedings where the arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions. Under Section 14(2) of the Act, only controversies about the grounds referred to in Section 14(1)(a) would give a party aggrieved access to the jurisdiction of the Court to substitute the arbitrator. In other words, only where questions arise as to whether the arbitral tribunal is truly de jure unable or de facto unable to perform as arbitrator, this Court would have jurisdiction to replace the arbitrator.

4. It is now well declared law that to attract the element of being de jure unable to perform, the arbitrator ought to be under a legal incapacity that renders him ineligible to act as an arbitrator. For example, where an individual acting as an arbitrator is elevated as a judge, he would be de jure unable to act despite being physically able to act. Likewise, where the arbitrator becomes incapacitated, say due to an illness, he would become de facto unable to perform even if there were no legal incapacity making him ineligible to act.

5. The Seventh Schedule lists the situations in which an arbitrator would become ineligible to perform. Eligibility would go to the root of the matter. If an arbitrator is rendered ineligible to function as such under the Seventh Schedule, he would be de jure unable to act as an arbitrator. Doubts and controversies in interpreting whether he is de jure unable to act would give jurisdiction to this Court under Section 14 of the Act.

6. In the instant case, evidently, the arbitrator does not attract any of the ineligibility conditions listed in the Seventh Schedule. Items 1 and 2 of the Seventh Schedule are pressed into service. These read as follows:-

Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel

1. The arbitrator is an employee, consultant, advisor or has any other past or present business relationship with a party.

2. The arbitrator currently represents or advises one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parties.

[Emphasis Supplied]

7. It will be seen from a plain reading of the foregoing that for Item 1, to be ineligible, the arbitrator ought to have a relationship with any party to the arbitration, whether past or present, but in the capacity as an employee, consultant, advisor or of any other business relationship. As for Item 2, to be ineligible, the arbitrator ought to currently represent one of the parties or an affiliate of one of the parti

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top