An injunction obtained under misrepresentation cannot be vacated without proven suppression of material facts; established trademark rights remain effective despite prior lawsuits.

JUDGMENT :

Arif S. Doctor, J.

1. Since the issues that arise for consideration and the submissions made in all three captioned Interim Applications are common, the captioned Interim Applications were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.

2. This Court on 7th May 2024 passed an ex parte ad interim Order by which the Defendants in the captioned Interim Applications were, inter alia, restrained from using the trade mark (“the said trade mark”) in relation to manufacturing, selling, advertising, distributing, marketing, exhibiting for sale or otherwise dealing in garments/uniforms (“the impugned goods”). The Defendants, on being served with the ex parte ad interim Order, have filed an Affidavit in Reply in Interim Application No. 1681 of 2025 invoking the provisions of Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), to have the ex parte ad interim Orders set aside on the ground that the Plaintiff had obtained the same by suppression of material facts.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS:

3. Mr. Vashi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Defendants, at the outset submitted that the Plaintiff had falsely stated in the Plaint that the cause of action arose in the fourth week of April 2024, and that it was on this basis, by creating a false sense of urgency, that the Plaintiff obtained ex parte ad-interim relief.

4. Mr. Vashi then submitted that the Plaintiff had suppressed the fact that in an earlier Suit[Writ Petition No. 2845 of 2002], (“the First Suit”), filed by one Anandilal and Ganesh Poddar Society (“the Society”) as Plaintiff No. 1, in which the present Plaintiff was arrayed as Plaintiff No. 2, the same reliefs had been sought for. He submitted that the First Suit had been filed against unknown persons, i.e., 'John Doe/Ashok Kumar' Defendants, in which ad interim relief had been refused by this Court by an order dated 28th February 2018.

5. Mr. Vashi pointed out that the Plaintiffs had thereafter filed a Chamber Summons seeking to implead four additional parties as Defendants to the First Suit, one of whom, i.e., ‘Ankur’, is the Defendant in two of the captioned Suits, namely, Suit No. 80 of 2025 and Suit No. 294 of 2024. He submitted that the Chamber Summons was allowed, and accordingly, ‘Ankur’, i.e., the Defendant to the Suit Nos 80 of 2025 and 294 of 2024, was impleaded as Defendant No. 4 to the First Suit. For ease of reference, the Defendants in Suit Nos. 80 of 2025 and 294 of 2024 shall hereinafter be referred to as the Defendants.

6. Mr. Vashi then also pointed out that in the First Suit, it had been specifically pleaded that the present Plaintiff was a licensee of the Society in respect of the said trade mark which was directly contrary to the stand taken by the Plaintiff in the present Suit, where the Plaintiff has claimed to be the registered proprietor of the same trade mark. He submitted that the First Suit was eventually dismissed for default, yet the Plaintiff, in the present Suit had once again impleaded ‘Ankur’ as a Defendant without making any reference to the First Suit.

7. Mr. Vashi then submitted that the Plaintiff had deliberately suppressed the First Suit and thus created a false sense of urgency basis which the Plaintiff had obtained the ex parte ad interim orders dated 7th May 2024. He submitted that such suppression amounted to a concealment of material facts, and on this ground alone, the ex parte ad interim order dated 7th May 2024 was required to be set aside. In support of his contention that suppression of material facts is sufficient to warrant the settin