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2026 Supreme(Bom) 17

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
RAJESH S. PATIL, J.
L&T Finance Ltd. (Formerly Known As L&T Housing Finance Ltd.) – Appellant
Versus
Sangeeta Bhansali (Borrower) – Respondent
Commercial Execution Application (L) No. 5277 of 2022, Interim Application No. 1950 of 2022
Decided On : 17-01-2026

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Disha Karambar
For the Respondents: Abhishek Sawant, Vaishali Sanghavi, Pratik Shetty, Ameet Mehta, Solicis Lex, Rubin Vakil

Unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator violates equal treatment principles and renders the award void ab initio under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Headnote:(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 12, 13(2), 34, and Fifth Schedule - Dispute arising out of Loan Agreement - Sole Arbitrator appointed unilaterally deemed void ab initio - Supreme Court ruled that unilateral appointment violates principle of equal treatment of parties and enforces mandatory statutory provisions - Appeal allowed, and prior award set aside. (Paras 10-19)

(B) Arbitration Agreement - The jurisdiction of the arbitrator is grounded in consent and must be valid within the framework of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. (Paras 10, 11, 12)

Facts of the case:
The dispute arose from a loan agreement between a financial institution and a borrower, leading to a unilateral arbitration appointment contested by the borrower. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the lender, which went unchallenged by the borrower.

Findings of Court:
The award and the execution application were set aside due to the ineligibility of the arbitrator, who was appointed unilaterally, which was deemed a fundamental jurisdictional flaw.

Issues: The main issue was the validity of the arbitrator's appointment and applicability of the law concerning unilateral appointments in arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator compromises parties' equal treatment and is null and void under Sections 12(5) and the Fifth Schedule of the Act, 1996.

Result: Award set aside and execution application dismissed.

Judgement Key Points

Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points summarized with appropriate references:

  • The dispute originated from a loan agreement between a financial institution and a borrower, leading to arbitration proceedings initiated by the lender (!) .
  • The borrower raised objections to the unilateral appointment of the sole arbitrator, which were rejected at various stages (!) (!) (!) .
  • The arbitrator passed an award in favor of the lender, which was not challenged by the borrower under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (!) (!) .
  • The enforcement of the arbitral award was sought through a commercial execution application, during which the borrower again challenged the validity of the arbitrator's appointment (!) .
  • The court examined recent legal principles and clarified that unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator violates the principle of equal treatment of parties and is therefore void ab initio, rendering any award passed by such an arbitrator unenforceable [judgement_subject][judgement_act_referred][Paras 10-12].
  • The court emphasized that challenges to an arbitrator’s ineligibility can be raised at any stage, including during execution proceedings, because awards passed by ineligible arbitrators lack legal recognition (!) (!) .
  • The court reaffirmed that awards passed without proper jurisdiction, such as through invalid arbitration proceedings, are null and can be challenged at any time [Para 13-14].
  • The court aligned with recent authoritative rulings that set aside arbitral awards based on unilateral appointment and ineligibility of the arbitrator, considering such awards to be void ab initio and non-enforceable [Paras 16-18].
  • The court concluded that the arbitral award and the subsequent execution application should be set aside, and the parties are permitted to initiate fresh arbitration proceedings in accordance with law [Paras 19-21].
  • The limitation period for initiating fresh arbitration proceedings is to be calculated from the date of invocation of arbitration until today, excluding this period [Para 22].
  • The court also acknowledged the assistance of the amicus curiae and disposed of the interim application accordingly [Paras 8] (!) .

Please let me know if you require a more detailed analysis or specific legal advice related to this case.


Table of Content
1. dispute arises from loan agreements. (Para 1)
2. applications challenging sole arbitrator's appointment were rejected. (Para 2 , 3 , 6)
3. judgment debtor did not challenge the award. (Para 4 , 5)
4. supreme court rules on unilateral appointment of arbitrator. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12)
5. decrees without jurisdiction are null and can be challenged at any stage. (Para 13 , 14)
6. similar cases affirm that unilateral appointments render awards void. (Para 15 , 16)
7. court concurs with previous rulings on void awards. (Para 17 , 18)
8. court sets aside award; parties may initiate fresh arbitration. (Para 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23)

JUDGMENT :

RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

1. The dispute between the parties is arising out of Loan Agreements. The Respondent no. 1 is Borrower who had approached and applied for mortgaged loan facilities from the Applicant-claimant. The Respondent no. 2 is the Co–Borrower for the loan advanced to the Respondent no. 1. Since the dispute arose between the parties under the said agreement, the claimant invoked Arbitration Clause, hence the lender – L & T Finance, appointment Sole Arbitrator, and the matter was referred to Arbitration.

2. Before the Sole Arbitrator, the Judgment Debtor initially raised the issue of unilateral appointment of Sole Arbitrator, by filing an Application under Sections 12 , 16 r/w. ground no. 22 of the Fifth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “Act, 1996”). The said Application filed by the Judgment Debtor was rejected by the Sole Arbitrator by its Order dated 23 July, 2019.

3. Similarly, before the Sole Arbitrator, the Judgment Debtor had filed an Application u/s 13(2) of the Act, 1996, for termination of the mandate of the Sole Arbitrator. The said Application filed by the Judgment Debtor was also rejected by an Order dated 30 July, 2019.

4. The Sole Arbitrator proceeded further with the arbitration hearing and by his Order dated 7 August, 2019 passed an Award directing the Judgment Debtor to pay to the Claimant a sum of Rs.1,01,12,482/- and a sum of Rs.1,57,559/- in respect of two loan accounts and further to pay interest on the said principal amount along with costs and fees of the Arbitrator.

5. Admittedly, the Judgment Debtor did not challenge the Award by filing an Application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.

6. Since the decreetal amount was not paid, the Claimant, filed this Commercial Execution Application before this Court, in which an Interim Application for disclosure of assets along with other reliefs was sought. In reply to the said Interim Application, the Judgment Debtor has once again raised an issue about Unilateral appointment of the Sole Arbitrator is void ab-initio.

7. Learned Single Judge of this Court (Coram : Abhay Ahuja, J.) by order dated 14 October, 2025 appointed Counsel Mr. Rubin Vakil as an Amicus Curiae in the present proceeding.

8. I have heard learned Counsel for the Decree Holder, Judgment Debtor and learned Amicus Curiae. I have also gone through the documents on record and judgments cited by the counsel.

9. Supreme Court in its recent judgment, decided on 5 January, 2026, in the matter of Bhadra International (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others vs. Airport Authority of India, Civil Appeal No. 37-38 of 2026, was dealing with the facts where the sole arbitrator passed an Award whereby claims and counter claims of the respective parties were rejected. Aggrieved by the dismissal of its claim, the appellant challenged the award u/s 34 before the Single Judge of Delhi High Court. While the said application u/s 34 was pending, the appellant sought to amend its application and to contend that since the arbitrator was appointed ‘unilaterally’, the award was liable to be set aside. The said amendment application of the appellant was rejected by the Single Judge. Being aggrieved by the said rejection, the appellant preferred an appeal u/s 37, before the Division Bench, which was also dismissed, pursuant to which the appellant preferred an

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