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2025 Supreme(Bom) 1843

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
AMIT BORKAR, J.
Uday Bhanudas Gujar – Appellant
Versus
Madan Yeshwant Diwan – Respondent
Writ Petition No.9384 Of 2014 With Interim Application NO.10178 Of 2022
Decided On : 19-12-2025

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr. Tejas D. Deshmukh a/w Mr. Ronak Utagikar, Mr. Onkar V. Somvanshi
For the Respondent:Ms. Sonali Kunekar, Mr. Aseem Naphade, ‘B’ Panel Advocate A/w Ms. M. S. Bane, AGP.

The Divisional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to revoke sale permission under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act, as no appellate remedy is provided in the statute, making the cancellation of permission legally impermissible.

Headnote:(A) Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act, 1999 - Section 12 - Validity of sale permission - The appellate order revoking permission for land transfer by Divisional Commissioner is without jurisdiction as no appeal is provided under the Act. The decision rendered regarding suppression of fact relating to a transfer agreement lacks legal ground. Jurisdictional authority must precede adjudication - the validity of the sale deed executed remains intact. (Paras 6, 12, 19, and 24)

(B) Jurisdiction - An authority cannot assume jurisdiction to adjudicate unless specifically conferred - Cancellation of a sale permission after execution and possession is impermissible without express statutory authority. (Paras 16, 20 and 21)

(C) Fraud - Allegation of fraud regarding non-disclosure of an irrelevant fact does not constitute grounds for revocation under the statute. (Paras 22)

Facts of the case:
The petitioner challenged the cancellation of sale permission after executing a sale deed, alleging that the appeal lacked jurisdiction as no appellate remedy existed under the Rehabilitation Act for such orders. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 claimed rights under a prior agreement of 1995 without seeking specific performance.

Findings of Court:
The Divisional Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to cancel the permission and the order was set aside, restoring the original sale permission and validity of the deed.

Issues: Whether an appeal existed to revoke permission granted under the Rehabilitation Act? Did the Divisional Commissioner have jurisdiction?

Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the cancellation was devoid of jurisdiction, as the Act did not provide for an appeal, nor did the authority have grounds to consider civil disputes while adjudicating permissions. The act of amending permissions after rights vested is impermissible without legal authority.

Result: Writ petition allowed.

Table of Content
1. factual backdrop of the case. (Para 1 , 2 , 4 , 10)
2. arguments presented by the parties. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 12 , 22)
3. court's observations on jurisdiction and procedure. (Para 9 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 18 , 20 , 24)
4. ratio decidendi related to jurisdiction and finality. (Para 11 , 17 , 19 , 21 , 23)
5. concluding remarks and order. (Para 25 , 26)

JUDGMENT :

AMIT BORKAR, J.

1. The challenge in this petition arises from the order dated 1 August 2014 passed by the Divisional Commissioner, Pune. By the said order, a purported appeal was entertained, and the sale permission dated 13 December 2010 granted in favour of the petitioner’s vendor, respondent No.6, under Section 12 of the Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act , 1999 was revoked. This permission had already been acted upon by execution of a registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner. The subject land forms part of Gat No.36, which was originally owned by respondent No.6 as on 8 May 1995. Respondent No.6 had executed an agreement to sell in favour of one Satish Tanksale on that date. Satish Tanksale has, till date, not filed any suit for specific performance. On 15 July 2010, respondent No.6 applied to respondent No.4 under Section 12 of the Rehabilitation Act seeking permission to transfer the land to the petitioner. On 13 December 2010, respondent No.4 granted such permission. Pursuant thereto, on 31 March 2011, respondent No.6 executed a registered sale deed in favour of the petitioner and handed over possession. On 25 April 2011, the petitioner’s name was entered in the revenue record by mutation entry No.1579. Thereafter, on 19 April 2011, Satish Tanksale executed an agreement in favour of respondent Nos.1 and 2, on the basis of which they claim rights allegedly flowing from the agreement to sell dated 8 May 1995.

2. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 thereafter started interfering with the petitioner’s possession over the land. The petitioner, therefore, filed Special Civil Suit No.1736 of 2011 on 30 August 2011 seeking an injunction to restrain respondent Nos.1 and 2 from disturbing his possession. The Trial Court granted the injunction on 10 May 2012. The said order was confirmed by the District Court.

3. On 9 November 2011, respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed Appeal No.44 of 2011 challenging the sale permission dated 13 December 2010 along with an application for condonation of delay. The petitioner filed his reply to the delay condonation application on 6 March 2012. On the same day, the petitioner also raised a specific objection regarding the maintainability of the appeal.

4. On 1 August 2014, respondent No.5 proceeded to hear the purported appeal on merits without first condoning the delay. Respondent No.5 cancelled the sale permission dated 13 December 2010 solely on the ground that respondent No.4 was not informed about the agreement dated 8 May 1995 and that Satish Tanksale was neither informed nor heard before grant of permission. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court.

5. This Court, by order dated 26 February 2018, issued Rule in the present petition.

6. Mr. Deshmukh, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the Rehabilitation Act does not provide for any appeal against an order granting permission for transfer. He contended that the appellate order is therefore without jurisdiction. He submitted that an order granting permission does not amount to a decision or order under Section 247 of the MAHARASHTRA LAND REVENUE CODE , as it does not adjudicate any right, title, or interest. According to him, the expression order must be read in the context of the preceding word decision, which contemplates adjudication of rights. He further submitted that the reasons recorded in the impugned order relate to alleged civil disputes, which respondent No.5 was not competent to examine. He submitted that under Section 12 (2) of the Rehabilitation Act, permission can be refused only if the proposed transfer defeats the object or provisions of the Act. H

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