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2002(1) Crimes 82 (SC)
Supreme Court of India
(From Patna High Court)
Umesh C. Banerjee and K.G. Balakrishnan, JJ.
Munshi Prasad & Ors. —Appellants
versus
State of Bihar —Respondent
Criminal Appeal Nos. 491-492 of 2001
Decided on 10-10-2001
Counsel for the Parties :
For the Appellants : R. Venkataramani, Sr. Advocate and Satya Mitra Garg, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Saket Singh, Advocate for B.B. Singh, Advocate.

Important Point
Scrutiny of evidence in a murder trial should be effected with more than ordinary care so as not to affect dispassionate judicial scrutiny.

Headnote:(i) Criminal Trial—Practice & Procedure of Apex Court in case of concurrent finding of fact in Murder case.

       Held : It is now a well-settled principle of law, that in an appeal against conviction for the offence of murder, Supreme Court would be rather slow to intervene, in the event of there being a concurrent finding of fact, unless of course, the finding reached suffers from some vice and thus violative of fundamental rules or even a definite procedural injustice going to the root of the prosecution case. (Para 1)

       (ii) Criminal Trial—Plea of “alibi” —Meaning and application—Whether applies to present case? (No).

       Held : The word ‘alibi’, a Latin expression means and implies in common acceptation ‘elsewhere’ : It is a defence based on the physical impossibility of participation of a crime by an accused in placing the latter in a location other than the scene of crime at the relevant time, shortly put the presence of the accused elsewhere when an offence was committed. This Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. (AIR 1981 SCC 911) has the following to state in regard to the plea of alibi:

       “The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at other place. The plea can therefore succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed...”

       —Distance thus would be a material factor in the matter of acceptability of the plea of alibi. Interestingly this plea as raised by Mr. Venkararamani, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal has been by reason of specific evidence as tendered before the Court by the defence witnesses. On assumption of the factum of the evidence being otherwise truthful, there appears to be some difficulty, however, in the matter of acceptance of submission of Mr. Venkataramani. The evidence on record as tendered by Raj Narain Prasad (defence witness No.2) was to the following effect:

       “2. On 27.6.80 at 12 PM a Panchayat was held in the garden of Yogendra Prasad. I went to Panchayat and told the head that I came to that a murder was committed in Nakka Tola. At that time it was not known to me as to who is murdered.

       3. At that time there were Bose Sahib, Manglue Sahani, Dasai Sahni, Naga Mehto, Hira Sahni, Multan Mian and Raghnath Mehto etc. in the Panchayat.

       4. When I reported then they became worried and all of them left with Head Mukhiaji. I also went.

       5. On the western side of the road 25-30 yards towards East there was a dead body in the sugar can field. There I also asked the people but I was not known as to who had killed. The dead body was at four-five hundred yards from this place of Panchayat, we stayed there near the dead body till 5-5.1/2 o’clock. Jamadar Sahib came there after we reached there.” (Emphasis supplied) (Para 2)

       Held further : A distance of 400-500 yards cannot possibly be said to be ‘presence elsewhere’ - it is not an impossibility to be at the place of occurrence and also at the panchayat meet, the distance being as noticed above: The evidence on record itself negates the plea and we are thus unable to record our concurrence as regards acceptance of the plea of alibi as raised in the appeal. (Para 3)

       (iii) Criminal Trial—Difference between inquest report and post-mortem report—Whether go to the root of the prosecution case? (No).

       Held : Preparation of an inquest report is a part of the investigation within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code and as noticed above neither the inquest report nor the post-mortem report can be termed to be a basic evidence or substantive evidence and discrepancy occurring therein can neither be termed to be fatal nor even a suspicious circumstance, which would warrant a benefit to the accused and the resultant dismissal of the prosecution case. On the factual score Mr. Venkataramani relied heavily on the evidence of PW-7 being the Jagdishpur Police Camp-in-charge. In his evidence, PW-7 stated that the inquest report was prepared on the basis of the information contained in Sanah No. 306 and since the Sanah has not been produced, it has been contended that Sanah being the basic information sheet, non-production thereof would entail the consequences of adverse presumption as regards the involvement of the accused persons. Obviously, thus it has been contended that nobody had any clue as to how the incident had occurred. Eloquent as always, Mr. Venkataramani has, in our view, over-emphasised the issue. Non-production of a substantive piece of evidence can under certain circumstances bring forth an adverse inference, but not in the present context. Technicality ought not to outweigh the course of justice on the face of trustworthy credible evidence on record and more so when the failure to produce does not go to the root of the prosecution case. Situations, obviously would entail such consequences but in the present context, one cannot possibly stretch it that far. (Para 6)

       (iv) Criminal Trial—Delayed FIR—Satisfactory explanation of delay—Whether can lead to the conclusion of its fabrication? (No).

       Held : It is thus strictly speaking of no consequence in the event the FIR has been delayed with a plausible explanation though on the factual score it is not even so. (Para 8)

       (v) Indian Penal Code, 1860—Section 302 —Seven appellants convicted for murdering one person—Conviction affirmed by High Court—Appeal to Supreme Court—Evidence of interested eye witness found corroborated by two independent witnesses—Evidence on record found trustworthy—Plea of alibi found not sustainable—False implication not proved —Prosecution proved definite motive for murder—Delay in FIR not unreasonable contradictions found immaterial—Result—Appeals dismissed—(Criminal Procedure Code, 1973—Section 313—Evidence Act—Words and Phrases—Alibi). (Paras 9 to 18)

       

Judgment

Banerjee, J.—It is now a well-settled principle of law, that in an appeal against conviction for the offence of murder, Supreme Court would be rather slow to intervene, in the event of there being a concurrent finding of fact, unless of course, the finding reached suffers from some vice and thus violative of fundamental rules or even a definite procedural injustice going to the root of the prosecution case. (See in this context, the decision of this Court in Arjun Marik and others v. State of Bihar: 1994 Suppl. 2 SCC p. 372). It is on this perspective that the present appeal against the common judgment dated 28th July, 1999 passed by the High Court of Patna in Crl. A. No. 590 of 1984 and 686 of 1984 shall have to be considered. Before adverting to the contentions in support of the appeal, in the matter in issue, a note of caution shall have to be kept in mind, as has been administered by this Court from time to time, that scrutiny of evidence in a murder trial should be effected with more than ordinary care so as not to affect ‘dispassionate judicial scrutiny’.

2. The judgment under appeal stands criticised on three major counts: the first of the three counts relate to the plea of alibi. The word ‘alibi’, a Latin expression means and implies in common acceptation ‘elsewhere’ : It is a defence based on the physical impossibility of participation of a crime by an accused in placing the latter in a location other than the scene of crime at the relevant time, shortly put the presence of the accused elsewhere when an offence was committed. This Court in Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. (AIR 1981  SCC 911) has the following to state in regard to the plea of alibi:

“The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at other place. The plea can therefore succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed...”

—Distance thus would be a material factor in the matter of acceptability of the plea of alibi. Interestingly this plea as raised by Mr. Venkararamani, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal has been by reason of specific evidence as tendered before the Court by the defence witnesses. On assumption of the factum of the evidence being otherwise truthful, there appears to be some difficulty, however, in the matter of acceptance of submission of Mr. Venkataramani. The evidence on record as tendered by Raj Narain Prasad (defence witness No.2) was to the following effect:

“2. On 27.6.80 at 12 PM a Panchayat was held in the garden of Yogendra Prasad. I went to Panchayat and told the head that I came to that a murder was committed in Nakka Tola. At that time it was not known to me as to who is murdered.

3. At that time there were Bose Sahib, Manglue Sahani, Dasai Sahni, Naga Mehto, Hira Sahni, Multan Mian and Raghnath Mehto etc. in the Panchayat.

4. When I reported then they became worried and all of them left with Head Mukhiaji. I also went.

5. On the western side of the road 25-30 yards towards East there was a dead body in the sugar can field. There I also asked the people but I was not known as to who had killed. The dead body was at four-five hundred yards from this place of Panchayat, we stayed there near the dead body till 5-5.1/2 o’clock. Jamadar Sahib came there after we reached there.” (Emphasis supplied).

3. Without attributing any motive and taking the evidence on its face value, therefore, it appears that the place of occurrence was at 400–500 yards from the place of Panchayat and it is on this piece of evidence, the learned Advocate for the State heavily relied upon and contended that the distance was far too short so as to be an impossibility for the accused to be at the place of occurrence - we cannot but lend concurrence to such a submission: A distance of 400-500 yards cannot possibly be

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