IMPORTANT POINT
Dishonour of cheque – Role of Court in convicting accused is different from role of Court while passing appropriate sentence in a given case.

ORDER

Heard Sri. Ismail Muneeb Musba, learned counsel for the revision petitioner and Sri. Sudarsan G for Sri. Gaonkar Dinesh Neelkant., learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The present revision petition is filed by the accused challenging the validity of the order of conviction and sentence passed in CC No.5905/2016 dated 15.10.2018 on the file of XIX Additional Chief Metropolitan magistrate, Bengaluru which was confirmed in Criminal Appeal No.2267/2018 dated 26.02.2021 on the file of LXIV Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

3. At the outset, Sri.Ismail Muneeb Musba, learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that in the event this Court confirming the order of conviction, it may consider the reduction of the sentence, as the learned Trial Magistrate has imposed the double the cheque amount without assigning any reasons in the impugned judgment which has been blindly confirmed by the learned judge in the First Appellate Court.

4. In other words, the revision petitioner is now restricted his revision only with regard to the sentence imposed.

5. Sri. Sudharshna, representing the counsel for the respondent. However, tried to impress upon the Court that even though, there are no special reasons assigning the judgment of the Trial Magistrate with regard to imposition of the double the cheque amount nor any reasons are forthcoming in the order of the First Appellate Court, while confirming the sentence, taking note of the fact that the incident is of the year 2013, the imposition of the double the cheque amount is justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.

6. Having heard the parties with regard to the sentence, this Court perused the material on record meticulously.

7. On such perusal of the material on record, as clearly found from material on record to uphold the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

8. Having said thus, it is noticed that the learned Trial Magistrate has imposed double cheque amount and out of the same, a sum of Rs.2,90,000/- is ordered to be paid as the compensation to the complainant and the balance is a sum of Rs.10,000/- towards the defraying expenses of the State. The same is confirmed by the learned judge in the First Appellate Court.

9. On careful perusal of both judgments, no special reasons are forthcoming for imposing the fine of Rs.3,00,000/- which is double the cheque amount. While, the learned Trial Magistrate has not assigned any reasons whatsoever much less the special reason, the learned judge in the First Appellate Court did not even the address the said issue as could be seen from para Nos.22 and 23 of the judgment of the First Appellate Court.

10. A feeble attempt is no doubt made by the learned counsel for the complainant before this Court to justify the same on the ground that the transaction is in the year 2013.

11. It is a settled principles of law and requires no emphasis, that the role of the Court in convicting an accused is different from the role of the Court while passing the appropriate sentence in a given case.

12. The statue no doubt invests the power in the learned Trial Magistrate to impose double the fine amount, if the facts and circumstances of such case, do warrant imposition double the cheque amount as the fine.

13. It is equally settled principles of law and requires no emphasis that every decision should be based on reasons in as much as reasoning in the heartbeat of a judgment. In the case on hand, no reason whatsoever is forthcoming for the imposition of the double the cheque amount by the Trial Magistrate much less special reasons. So also learned judge in the First Appellate court has not assigned any reason to confirm the sentenced imposed by the Trial Magistrate.

14. Being the judge in the First Appellate Court, was duty bound not only to consider the merits of the case insofar as the order o