IMPORTANT POINT
The suit would commence on the day when the plaint would be presented to the proper court.

F.I. Rebello, J.—Rule, Heard forthwith.

The petitioners have approached this Court against the order of the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal which after accepting the contention of the petitioners herein that the proceedings filed before it by the respondent were without jurisdiction directed the return of the plaint (Application) for presentation to the proper Court. The petitioners are aggrieved by this part of the order. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioners that the Tribunal under the Act being a creature of statute, consequently would have no jurisdiction to direct return of the Original Application to the respondent for presentation to the proper Court. The application filed under Section 19 of the Act is neither a plaint nor a suit as contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure and as the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993, hereinafter referred to as R.D.B. Act, does not have a provision for return of plaint, it was not open to the Tribunal to direct return of the plaint.

2. On the other hand on behalf of the respondent it is submitted that considering the language of Section 22 of the R.D.B. Act the Tribunal is not bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant portion of Section 22 of the R.D.B. Act reads as under:

“22. Procedure and powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal— (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have their sittings.

(2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:

(a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) Requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) Receiving evidence on affidavits;

(d) Issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;

(e) Reviewing its decisions;

(f) Dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte;

(g) Setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte;

(h) Any other matter which may be prescribed.”

It is further submitted that merely because some specific powers under the C.P.C. have been conferred under sub-section (2), the Tribunal will not cease to have jurisdiction to exercise those powers based on equity. The only fetter in exercise of the procedural powers is to observe the principles of natural justice.

3. The question, therefore, for consideration of this Court is whether after the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, could it then have passed the consequential order of directing return of the plaint (Application).

4. A few facts may be set out: The petitioners owned a flat which was let out to respondent for a period of 3 years. The respondent by way of security kept deposit of Rs. 21,00,000 with the petitioners. According to the petitioners respondent terminated the license before the expiry of the period. The petitioners in preparation of handing over gave a cheque dated 3.10.2000 for the return of the security deposit amount. According to the petitioners they paid Rs. 21,00,000 in cash because the petitioners wanted early possession of the flat as there was another multi-national bank who was willing to take the same on licence. The respondent on 3.10.2000 presented the cheque which was returned on the next day. It is not necessary to refer to the other averments except to state that the respondent thereafter filed a suit for recovery of the amount as set out in the che