A decree against the manager of a joint Hindu family as representing the family with regard to a debt contracted by him for family necessities is binding upon all the members of the family, and the creditor can recover the amount payable to him by a sale of the entire co-parcenary property without impleading the other members of the family.

Narayan, J.

1. The defendants are the appellants, and the appeal, arises out of a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession with regard to 8 bighas 2 kathas 1 dhur of land situate in village Ghosrama alias Subhankar-pur Madho. This land was the property of three brothers named Banjar Kuer, Kishun Kuer and Bishun Kuer. Kishun died issueless, and the defendants first party, the appellants before this Court, are the sons of Banjar. The branch of Bishun is not represented in this litigation.

2. The case which the plaintiffs had set up was that Kishun had died in a state of joint-ness with his two brothers Banjar and Bishun, both of whom as members of the Co-operative Society used to borrow loans from that Society. The Society obtained a decree against Bishun, and in execution of that decree purchased this property at an auction sale which was held on 20-12-1932. Possession of the ]and was delivered to the Society on 6-12-1933, and thereafter the Society sold the land to one Ram Narayan by a registered sale-deed dated 21-4-1942. Ram Narayan in his turn sold the land to the plaintiffs by another registered sale-deed dated 7-4-1943. The contention of the plaintiffs is that Bishun had been sued as the karta or the manager of the joint Hindu family consisting of his own branch and Banjars branch, and they allege that they were dispossessed by the defendants from the land in Chait 1352 Fasli.

3. The defendants first party whp are the sons of Banjar resisted the plaintiffs claim their allegation being that the three brothers were separate from one another, that Bishun was not a member of the Society and no decree had been obtained against him, and that they had all along been in possession of the disputed property. They did not admit that there was an auction sale or a delivery of possession with regard to the disputed property.

4. The defendants second party also contested the suit, the pleas set up by them being that plot No. 1277 is their ancestral kasht land and that they are the bharnadars of plots nos. 1244 and 1245, under a bharna bond dated 24-5-1941 executed in their favour by the defendants first party.

5. The Court of first instance held that the Society had purchased the land in execution of a decree against Bishun only and that the suit was barred by limitation, because the Society did not obtain possession of the property. According to the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge Banjar and Bishun were separate from each other, and plot No. 1277 was the ancestral land of the defendants second party. The suit was accordingly dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge.

6. On an appeal haying been preferred by the plaintiffs, the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge was reversed by the learned Additional District Judge who declared the title of the plaintiffs and directed that they would obtain khas possession of the land.

7. The defendants first party alone are the appellants before this Court, and Mr. Mehdi Imam who has appeared on their behalf in this Court has contended that Banjar being no party to the decree or the execution proceeding his and his sons interest in the property had not been affected by the decree or the sale and that the claim as against Eanjars branch was barred by limitation.

8. Even according to the findings of the learned Additional District Judge the Society did not obtain actual possession of the property on 6-12-1933 which is the date of the delivery of possession. As the learned Additional District Judge says, the Society had obtained only formal "dakhal dehani". Even if, however, the possession delivered to the Society was only symbolical possession, it will be deemed equivalent to actual possession as against the judgment-debtor or his representatives, and the suit will be deemed to have been brought within time if it has been brought within twelve years from the date of the symbolical possession. This position in law is now very well settled, and I may cite a recent