Entries in the record-of-rights, which state that certain properties are resumable on certain conditions, carry a presumption of correctness and will prevail until rebutted by proper evidence.

Misra, J.

1. This is an appeal on behalf of defendants 4 to 9 arising out of a suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent for a declaration that the plaintiff had the right to resume the properties in suit described in the schedule of the plaint and that the defendants were mere trespassers, because they had no right to continue in possession after ths death of Shambhunath Singh who was the last lawful holder of the interest in suit.

The case of the plaintiff was that the suit properties which are comprised in six khewats were carved out of Baranda estate which is held by the plaintiff and which is impartible in character. According to the custom of the family, the Law of primogeniture prevails in respect of succession to the estate and the junior members are granted certain properties to be held so long as there are legitimate heirs of the original grantee of the property. On death, however, of the grantee and on the failure of the legitimate heirs to the estate, whenever that event might happen, the property was liable to resumption to the original estate. According to the plaintiff, this is one of many such estates which are found in the Division of Chota Nagpur. The plaintiffs case is that up to the year 1932 there were lawful holders of the estate, and it was only after the death of the last lawful holder Shambhunath that, by virtue of death in various branches of the family of the Khorposdar, namely, Krishna Singh the original grantee, there was a complete failure of legitimate lineal descendants of Krishna Singh which gave the cause of action for the plaintiff to bring a suit to resume the estate in terms of the family custom and the grant made to Krishna Singh.

2. The appellants were impleaded as purchasers of certain portions of the property in the year 1875 in execution of a decree against one Maninath Singh, one of the descendants of Krishna Singh. The other persons who were impleaded as defendants were either illegitimate descendants of Krishna Singh or who held other portions of the property in suit in some other right.

3. The defence raised in the case was among others, that the Baranda estate held by the plaintiff was not an impartible estate but an ordinary Hindu joint family property subject to the right of division in Hindu law, and that there was no complete failure of legitimate descendants of Krishna Singh, because defendant 1 Harihar Singh was a son of Balram Singh born in lawful wedlock and that the plaintiffs case that Balram Singh as well as his son Harihar Singh was illegitimate was false and fraudulent.

The learned Subordinate Judge of Ranchi who decided the suit accepted the plaintiffs case and decreed the suit holding that the Baranda estate is an impartible property governed by the law of primogeniture, as also that Balram Singh and Harihar Singh were both illegitimate and that Deonath Singh died without leaving any legitimate child whatsoever. The defendants being aggrieved by that filed an appeal in the Court of the learned Judicial Commissioner of Ranchi who affirmed the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. He came to a concurrent finding of fact that Deonath Singh died without leaving any legitimate son and that Balram Singh, the father of defendant Harihar Singh, was really illegitimate and Harihar was also illegitimate so that there was complete failure of the legitimate lineal descendants of Krishna Singh after the death of Shambhunath Singh who alone was the last legitimate surviving descendant of Krishna Singh. That event took place in 1932, and as such, the plaintiffs suit which was within twelve years of that was in time and that the plaintiff had a cause of action to bring a suit for resumption of the property in suit.

Mr. B. C. De appearing on behalf of the appellants in this Court has raised two points; (1) that the finding of the learned Judicial Commissioner on the point of the character of the estate is not a sustainable finding in law, and (2) that likewise the findin