A proceeding in a writ application is not necessarily a civil proceeding within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution. The nature of the proceeding depends on the nature of the application and the questions raised and decided in the proceeding.

Das, J.

1. These are two applications for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133 of the Constitution. The facts are these : The petitioners were assessed to tax under Sec.23, Income Tax Act to heavy amounts well over Rs. 20,000/-; as a matter of fact, the petitioners were assessed to tax exceeding several lakhs.

Against these assessment orders the petitioners filed two applications for the issue of writs under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, on the main grounds that the orders of assessment were without jurisdiction and vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. These two writ applications were dismissed summarily by a Bench of this Court by an order dated 23-3-1955. The petitioners now ask for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from the said order of the Bench, dated 23-3-1955.

2. The contention of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that his clients have a right to a certificate under Sub-clause (a) or Sub-clause (b) of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution.

In the two applications for a certificate, Article 132 of the Constitution has also been mentioned, but learned Counsel for the petitioners has frankly conceded that he is not in a position to ask for a certificate under Clause (1) of Article 132 of the Constitution, because the two writ applications were dismissed in limine, and it can hardly be said that any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved in the dismissal order.

Learned Counsel for the petitioners has, however, very strongly contended that his clients have the right to a certificate either under Sub-clause (a) or Sub-clause (b) of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution. His argument is that the order of the Bench dated 23-3-1935, is a final order in a civil proceeding; and as the amount or value of the subject-matter of dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal is not less than Rs. 20,000/-, his clients have a right to a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) or (b) of the Constitution.

The second part of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution states that where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in Sub-clause (c) the High Court must further certify that the appeal involves some substantial question of law.

The argument of learned Counsel for the petitioners is that this second part of Clause (1) of Article 133 has no application in the present case, because the order of the High Court was passed not in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction but in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

3. On behalf of the Income Tax Department learned Counsel for the opposite party has raised a twofold contention; firstly, that the order of the Bench, dated 23-3-1S55, is not a final order within the meaning of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution; and secondly, that the proceeding was not a civil proceeding.

The relevant part of Clause (1) of Article 133 of the Constitution states that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India, if the High Court certifies : (a) that the amount or value of the subject-matter of the dispute in the Court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than Rs. 20,000/-, or (b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value.

There is no difficulty about the value of the subject-matter of dispute in these two cases; the value is undoubtedly not less than Rs. 20,000/-. As to whether the order of the Bench dated 23-3-1925, is a final order or not, it seems to me that the order is clearly a final order so far as the two writ applications are concerned.

By the order dated 23-3-1955, a