The limitation period for a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property starts from the date of execution of the sale deed and not from the date of registration.

Kanhaiya Singh, J.

1. This is an appeal by the defendants first party from a decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge of Muzaffarpur, dated the 20th January, 1951, reversing the decree of the Munsif of Sitamarbi, dated the 27th July, 1949. The relevant facts He within a short compass. On the 3rd November, 1930, defendants Nos. 16 and 17 and one Baleshwar Singh for self and as guardian of defendants Nos. 18, 19 and 20 all of the second party, executed a deed of sale In favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the Properties mentioned in schedules I and II to the plaint.

On the 10th November, 1930, they executed another sale deed in favour of the defendants first party in respect of the properties mentioned in schedule I to the plaint along with other properties, which was duly registered. The sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs was presented for registration on 4th November, . 1930, but for want of admission of execution of the deed by the executants, it could not be registered. On the 16th January, 1931, the plaintiffs filed an application before the Sub Registrar at Sitamarhi for compulsory registration of their deed.

The registration was refused by the Sub Registrar on 2nd February, 1931, and an appeal from his decision to the District Sub Registrar, Muzaffarpur, also failed on 29th June, 1931. Thereupon the plaintiffs instituted title suit No. 30/36 of 1931/1933 under section 77 of the Indian Registration Act for compulsory registration of the deed of sale. I may note here that the defendants first party were not impleaded in the suit as defendants. The Subordinate Judge who heard the suit dismissed it on 30th June, 1933. The plaintiffs took an appeal to the District Judge from this decision, which was allowed on 7th May, 1934, and the plaintiffs suit for compulsory registration was decreed.

The decree was put into execution and the sale deed was compulsorily registered on 23rd May, 1934. The defendants second party preferred an appeal to the High Court which was dismissed on 28th March, 1935. On 6th May, 1946, the present suit was instituted by the plaintiffs for a declaration of title to and recovery of possession of the properties mentioned in schedule I to the plaint and for confirmation of possession after establishment of their title in respect of schedule II properties with mesne profits.

2. The defendants first party resisted the plaintiffs claim substantially on two grounds: firstly, that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs was a forged and fabricated document and, secondly that the suit was barred by limitation and they had acquired title by prescription. By a separate written statement the defendants second party supported the case made out by the defendants first party.

3. The learned Munsif held that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs was genuine and valid. As to the payment of the consideration, his finding was that only Rs. 86 out of the consideration of Rs. 2351 had been paid. He further held that the plaintiffs had possession over the properties mentioned in schedule II to the plaint. With respect to the schedule I properties, his finding was that the defendants first party were In possession continuously since the date of their sale deed and that the plaintiffs had knowledge of their sale deed and the suit was, therefore, barred by limitation. Accordingly he granted the plaintiffs a decree against the defendants second party confirming their possession over schedule II properties and dismissed the suit against the defendants first party in respect of schedule I properties.

4. The plaintiff toot an appeal to the District Judge and the learned Subordinate Judge, who eventually disposed of the appeal, affirmed the finding of the learned Munsif that the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs was genuine and valid and that only Rs. 86 had been paid to them out of the consideration. On the question of limitation, however, there was a divergence off opinion between the two courts below.

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