The starting point of limitation for the execution of a decree is the date of the amendment of the decree, and not the date of the original decree.

1. This appeal is brought on behalf of the decree-holders against an order of the Additional District Judge of Muzaffarpur, dated 6th November, 1956, holding that the execution of the final decree for mesne profits was barred by limitation.

2. It appears that the final decree for mesne profits was made in Title Suit No. 208 of 1939 on the 5th June, 1951, in the following terms:

"that the commissioners report is hereby confirmed against both sets of the defendants. Let the decree be prepared for mesne profits as per commissioners report on plaintiffs filing requisite court-fee."

A formal decree was prepared in pursuance of this order on the 8th May, 1952, and notified to the parties. It appears that this decree contained no other details except the number of the suit and the names of the parties. On the 3rd February, 1954, the plaintiffs made an application before the Munsifs Court for the preparation of the final decree. On the 12th March, 1954, the plaintiffs were directed by the court to file the requisite court-fee) of Rs. 528/12/- and also a petition for amendment of the decree. Acting on the. direction of the court the decree-holders paid the requisite court-fee and also made an application for amending the decree. On the 31st March, 1954, the decree was amended by the Munsif and for the first time details of the amount of mesne profits were inserted in the decree. The execution case was taken out on 21-6-1954, and the objection of the judgment-debtors was that the execution case was barred because it was filed beyond three years from the date of the final decree which must be taken to be the 5th June. 1951. The lower appellate court allowed this objection of the judgment-debtors on the ground that the terminus a quo for the execution case was the date of the final decree for mesne profits, namely, the date of the order made in Title Suit No. 208 of 1939, that is, the 5th June, 1951, and not the date of the amendment of the decree which was the 31st March. 1954. The lower appellate court proceeded upon the view that the amendment was not necessary because the order of the 5th Juno, 1951, finally determined the rights and liabilities of the parties and there was no occasion for the rectification of any other mistake.

3. In support of this appeal the contention put forward by learned Counsel for the appellants is that the view taken by the lower appellate court is wrong and the starting point of limitation is the date of the amendment, namely, the 31st March, 1954, and the execution case was not barred by limitation. It was also pointed out on behalf of the appellants that the amendment of the decree was made within three years from the date of the decree of mesne profits, namely, from the 5th June, 1951. In our opinion the contention put forward on behalf of the appellants is well founded and must be accepted as correct. Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act provides a period of three years as the period of limitation for the execution of a decree from the date of the amendment of the decree "where the decree has been amended. It was submitted by learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the original decree dated 5th June, 1951, did not require amendment because it finally determined the rights of the parties and the amendment made on the 31st March, 1954, was not really in the nature of a substantial amendment but merely an arithmetical calculation was inserted in the decree. We are unable to accept the submission of learned Counsel as right. We do not consider that it is open to the executing court to go behind the order of amendment and to enquire whether the amendment was a substantial amendment or merely an amendment of a clerical or arithemetical nature. It is also not open to the executing court to go into the question whether the amendment was necessary or not necessary or whether the Court of the Munsif wag competent to make the amendment or not. In our opinion, the language of Article 182 must