In a case where both parties are found to be in joint possession of property, the Magistrate should not drop the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but should pass an order holding the parties to be jointly in possession. The Magistrate may also start a proceeding under Section 107 of the Code to bind the parties over to keep the peace.

Misra, J.

1. The petitioner, Sudamawati Kuer, is the widow of one Rambharosa Singh of village More, within police station Mokama, in the district of Patna. Opposite party No. 1, Ramchandra Singh, is a minor son of Rambharosa Singh; Ramlakhan Singh, opposite party No. 2 is the father-in-law or Ramchandra Singh (opposite party No. 1) and Janardgn Singh, opposite party No. 3, is the brother of Ramlakhan Singh. Opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 are not interested. The application arises out of a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and relates to the properties left behind by Rambharosa Singh, who died sometime in 1949. On the 23rd of Juns, 1953, the petitioner, Sudama-wati, was appointed guardian of the minor. In 1956, Ramchandra Singh was married to the daughter of Ramlakhan Singh. On account of certain differences which cropped up between the petitioner and Ramlakhan Singh, she applied to the District Judge to be discharged from the guardianship of the minor. The tension between the parties gave rise to a dispute causing an apprehension of the breach ot peace.

Accordingly, on the 21st February, 1958, a proceea-ing was started between them under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the prevention of the breach of peace. On the 22nd of April, 1958, an order was passed by the Magistrate that the minor was in possession ot his share of the property. On the 16th of June, 1958, there was another proceeding under Sec.144 which was converted into a proceeding under Sectoin 145 of the Code on the 3rd of September, 1958. The application or the petitioner to the District Judge for being discharged from the guardianship was allowed on the 11th of June, 1959, and an order was passed by the learned District Judge on the 27th of November 1959, directing that Schedule 2 properties should be handed over to the maternal uncle of Ramchandra Singh, but no order was passed in respect of schedule 1 property. The proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which relates to schedule 1 property could not be disposed of by the learned Magistrate because in his opinion it involved difficult questions of fact and, accordingly, on the 20th August, 1959, he referred the question regarding the claims of possession of the parties to the Civil Court under Sec.145 (i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a finding as to which party was in actual possession. The Munsif of Barn, on a consideration of the evidence, returned a finding that the Mossamat, i.e. the petitioner, was in possession of the property as guardian of the minor. The petitioner is aggrieved by that order in so far as the learned Munsif has held her to be in possession only as the guardian of the minor and not in her own right in respect of halt the property to which she would be entitled as a Hindu widow, her husband having died in 1949 at a time when the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 (Act 18 of 1937), governed the rights of Hindu women in joint family properties.

2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order of the learned Munsif is erroneous. He does not make any grievance that schedule 2 properties were the personal properties of Ramchandra Singh, step-son of tne petitioner, and she did not claim any interest in those properties. But so far as schedule 1 properties are concerned, which were left behind by her deceased Husband, she did have a right to be in possession as a Hindu woman stepping into the shoes of her husband after the latters death. The joint family consisted of Rambharosa Singh, her husband, and Ramchandra Singh, her step-son (Opposite Party No. 1), and the properties being ancestral Ramchandra Singh would acquire a right to those properties at the time of his birth. But this would not deprive the petitioner (the widow of Rambharosa Singh) to claim half interest in the joint family properties in the same way as her deceased husband would hold a right to these properties which would be a moiety shar