The court's interpretation of Section 7(d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which disqualifies a person from being a member of Parliament if they have a contract with the appropriate Government for the supply of goods or the execution of works, is significant. The court held that the word "works" in the provision connotes something to be built or constructed, and not merely something to be done.

R.J.Bahadur, J.

1. This is an appeal under Sec.116-A of the Representation of the People- Act, 1951, (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) by Yugal Kishore Sinha, who was the petitioner before the Election Tribunal Darbhanga, and had asked it to declare the election of the respondent, Nagendra Prasad Yadav, to the Lok Sabha from the 12th Sitamarhi Parliamentary constituency as void.

2. Besides the appellant and the respondent there were five other candidates, who had filed nomination papers to fill the said seat and the respondent was declared elected from the above mentioned constituency on the 1st March, 1962. The appellant thereafter submitted a petition before the Election Tribunal challenging the election of the respondent on two grounds. The first ground was that the respondent held benami in the name of his wife Smt. Vidyabati Debi a stage carriage permit No. 190/60 under the North Bihar Regional Transport Authority for plying a bus on Muzaffar-pur-Sitamarhi-Sursand route. It was said that this was "an office of profit" under the State Government and since the respondent was the real holder of the said office he was disqualified to be a member of the Lok Sabha under Article 102 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The second ground was that as the respondent was the real permit holder, he was, according to the terms of the contract embodied in the said permit, to carry mail for the Union Government and as such was also disqualified to be a member of the Lok Sabha under Section 7 (d) of the Act. On these grounds the appellant prayed that the election of the respondent be declared void. The respondent denied that he held an "office of profit" under the State of Bihar or that he was disqualified to be a member of the Lok Sabha under Section 7 (d) of the Act.

3. The Tribunal rejected the contentions of the appellant and accordingly dismissed his petition. It is against this order of the Tribunal that the present appeal has been filed by the appellant.

4. Mr. Ranen Roy, who has appeared to the appellant, has pressed these two contentions be fore us. As regards the first contention, he has urged that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the real owner of the bus business was Smt. Vidyabati Debi, wife of the respondent He has submitted two points, which arise for consideration though they overlap each other They are (1) whether the respondent was the real permit holder and owner of the bus and his wife Vidyabati Debi was merely a name lender and (ii) whether the respondent was actually running the bus business on behalf of his wife.

5. Learned counsel frankly conceded that the approach of the Tribunal on the question of onus was correct, in that, the ostensible owner must be taken to be the real owner until contrary is proved and that there is no presumption in law that what stands in the name of the wife belongs to the husband. He, however, urged that the appellant had satisfactorily discharged the said onus and the Tribunal had failed to appreciate the evidence on the record It will, therefore, be convenient to deal with the points in the order that he has raised them.

6. The Tribunal round that the permit (Ext. 8/a) was applied for by Vidyabati Debi, wife of the respondent, and it was issued in her name vide Ext. 4 The agreement relating to the purchase of the bus on hire purchase system (Ext. 9), the receipts showing payments of the instalments, (Ext. 19 series), the challans showing deposit of permit fees (Exts. 6 series) and all the material documents relating to the transaction are in the name of the wife of the respondent Learned counsel submitted that the motive for the benami transaction was that the respondent had applied for a Congnress ticket for the election to the Legislative Assembly in 1952 as well as in 1957 though he failed to obtain the Congress ticket on those two occasions The respondent has not denied this fact The application for the bus permit (Ext. 8/a) was made in September. 1958 I