A tenant who holds over after the expiry of his term becomes a tenant on sufferance, and the landlord's assent alone will suffice to convert such a tenancy into a tenancy from year to year, or from month to month, according to the nature of the original lease.

G.N.Prasad, J.

1. This is an appeal by the principal defendants (defendants 1 to 3) in a suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent for declaration of his title to and recovery of khas possession over a house property comprised in plot No. 463 of Mauza Kirkend within Pargana Jharia. There was also a claim for damages for use and occupation of the property.

2. It is now undisputed that the property which originally belonged to the defendants or their predecessor in interest was conveyed to the plaintiff by a registered sale deed (Ext. 1) dated the 9th October 1922 for a consideration of Rs. 5,000.00 made up of certain earlier dues of the defendants to the plaintiff. It is also undisputed that after the title had passed to the plaintiff, the defendants continued in possession of the property as tenants under the plaintiff. A letter (Ext. 13/-e) acknowledging the tenancy was written by Lachmi Narain, the lather of the principal defendants, on the very day on which the sale deed (Ext. 1) was executed, and the rent agreed upon was Rs 7.8.0 per month for a portion of the house. Subsequently, other documents described as Kirayanamas were executed by Lachmi Narain, whereby the defendants became tenants in respect of the entire house. The last of such Kirayanamas was executed by Lachmi Narain is Magh 1988 corresponding to sometime in 1932. The defendants paid rent to the plaintiff in terms of the agreement until 1938.

3. On the 3rd January 1945, the plaintiff gave a pleaders notice to quit (Ext. 6) calling upon the defendants to vacate the house and to restore the plaintiff to possession over it at the expiry of Magh 2001 Sambat. The case of the plaintiff is that thereafter he made further demands for vacant possession of the house from the defendants, but the defendants failed to restore possession to him. Accordingly, he instituted the present suit for the reliefs mentioned above on the 9th March 1953.

4. The defence put forward by the principal defendants so far as they are now relevant, was that the relationship of landlord and tenant between them and the plaintiff came to end with effect from the 22nd February 1933, that is to say, upon the expiry of one year from the date of execution of last Kirayanama (Ext. 13/b) in favour of the plaintiff. According to the defendants, after that day, they began to exercise acts of ownership over the property in suit and paid Choukidar taxes and Water Board tax in their capacity as owners of the property. In this way, they remained in adverse possession over the property at least from 1938-39 when they had stopped the payment of rent to the plaintiff. Such adverse possession having continued for over twelve years, the defendants had become absolute owners of the property and, therefore, the suit instituted in 1953 was, barred by limitation.

5. The defence of adverse possession succeeded in the trial Court which, accordingly, dismissed the suit. On appeal, however, the learned Single Judge reversed the decision of the trial Court and decreed the suit holding that the relationship of landlord and tenant which subsisted between the parties continued until the 3rd January, 1945, when the plaintiff determined the tenancy by the notice (Ext. 6), and that the suit having been "instituted within twelve years from that date, was not barred by limitation in view of Article 139 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Hence this appeal by the principal defendants under the Letters Patent.

6. The only question for our decision is what was the starting point of limitation in this case. In other words, when did the relationship of landlord and tenants cease. According to the plaintiff, the tenancy came to an end by virtue of the notice (Ext. 6) which was a notice to quit in terms of Clause (h) of Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the suit instituted within twelve years of the expiration of the said notice to determine the lease is within time. As against this the c