1. This is a defendants second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment from a house described in Schedule B of the plaint situated in Mauza Kheshmi, in the District of Dhanbad, on two grounds, namely, default in payment of monthly rentals and personal necessity. Admittedly, the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, have not been made applicable to the area in question and therefore the two grounds for eviction taken by the plaintiffs are not relevant as under the general law the consideration would be quite different.

2. Originally, the suit premises belonged to one Makund Lal Sud. By a registered sale deed dated 19-3-1964, the plaintiffs purchased the same. The defendant was already in occupation of the premises in suit from before on a monthly rental of Rs. 35/-, and admittedly according to the English Calendar month. The sale deed was taken in the names of all the six plaintiffs, out of whom, four, namely, plaintiffs Nos. 3 to 6 are minors and the two major plaintiffs, namely, Har Bhajan Singh and Hardayal Singh are brothers. After the purchase aforesaid, the tenant defendant and the plaintiffs landlords entered into an agreement on 23-4-1964 (Ext. A) under which it was agreed that the rent of the premises in question would be raised from Rs. 35/- to Rs. 45/- per month from the 1st of April, 1964 and that the rent would be received by Har Bhajan Singh, plaintiff No. 1. This agreement was signed, besides the defendant, by the father of the two major plaintiffs, plaintiff No. 1 and some witnesses. It is also necessary to refer to a further stipulation under this agreement on which long arguments were advanced by Mr. S.C. Ghose appearing for the appellant. This agreement provided that the tenant could continue in the premises so long as he desired (wo jabtak chahe makan me rah sekta hai, kiraya deta huye). A notice dated 22-8-1967 (Ext. 1) under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act was issued through a lawyer on the instruction of plaintiff No. 1, terminating the tenancy on the expiry of September 1967. It further appears from Ext. B, an office copy of an earlier notice dated 30-3-1964, issued through another lawyer on behalf of all the plaintiffs, immediately on the purchase of the premises in question, to the defendant, demanding possession of the same "within a week from the service hereof". This notice was issued on behalf of all the plaintiffs, which seems to have resulted in the settlement at the intervention of their well-wishers, evidenced under the deed of agreement (Ext. A) referred to above.

3. The suit was contested by the defendant who denied the allegation of default in payment of rents and personal necessity, etc., with which we are not concerned any more. The other plea was that the agreement in question created a perpetual lease in favour of the defendants and, therefore, the same could not be terminated or determined by the plaintiffs and that he was entitled to live in the house till his lifetime. The validity of the notice Ext. 1 was also challenged on the ground that it was issued on behalf of only one of the plaintiffs who was only a co-sharer and not entitled to terminate the tenancy on behalf of the other co-sharers, unless specifically authorised.

4. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the finding that the tenancy was for life and the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid, having been issued by only one of the plaintiffs. On appeal, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge has decreed the suit. One further contention that appears to have been urged on behalf of the defendant in the court of appeal below, which has been very seriously pressed by Mr. Ghose in this Court, is that the period of commencement of the tenancy in this case would be not according to the English Calendar month, but from the 19th of March, 1964, the date of the purchase of the premises in question by the plaintiffs and therefore, the notice to quit, in any event, must