S.ALI AHMAD, J.

1. This appeal by the decree-holder opposite party arises out of an order passed u/s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure dismissing the execution case as barred by limitation.

2. To appreciate the points involved in the case, it will be necessary to mention a few dates. The judgment in Money Suit No. 17/3 of 1953/57 was delivered on 24.08.1957. The decree, which was for recovery of Rs. 21,154/13/4 besides costs, was sealed and signed on 16.11.1957. Execution petition was presented on 10.10.1969 for execution of the aforesaid decree. This application was registered as Execution Case No. 13 of 1969 before the Second Additional Subordinate Judge, Bhagalpur. The judgment-debtors respondents appeared and filed objection u/s. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure contending, inter alia, that the decree could not be executed as it had become barred by lapse of time. The court below on a consideration of the materials placed before it came to the conclusion that Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was applicable and the fact that the junior advocate of the decree- holder-appellant was under the wrong impression that time began to run not from 24.08.1957 but from 17.11.1957 was immaterial and that the prayer in the circumstance for condoning the delay, could not be allowed. Since the execution was levied beyond the period of 12 years, the court below held that the execution was barred by limitation as provided under Art. 136 of the Act. It accordingly dismissed the execution case. Hence this appeal by the decree-holder-appellant.

3. Mr. T.K. Prasad in support of the appeal first contended that the scope of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , has now been made much wider than what it was under the Limitation Act, 1908. He contended, therefore, that the delay, if any, in filing the execution petition should be condoned as it was caused on account of wrong advice given by the junior advocate. It is true that the scope of Sec. 5 of the Act is now wider but this section itself excludes admittance of any application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure after the period prescribed by the Act. It is clear, therefore, that the time prescribed by the Act cannot be extended under any circumstance under this section. This argument, therefore, must fail.

4. Admittedly the Article applicable for recovery of the decretal amount is Art. 136 of the Act. This Article corresponds to Art. 182 of the Old Limitation Act. It will be useful to quote these Articles. Article 136 of the Act and Art. 182 of the Old Limitation Act run as follows:-

Act of 1963, Art.136. "136. For the execution of any decree (other than a decree granting a mandatory injunction) or order of any civil Court. Twelve years. When the decree or order becomes enforceable or where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods when default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which execution is sought takes place: Provided that an application for the enforcement or execution of the decree granting a perpetual injunction shall not be subject to any period of limitation."

Act of 1908, Art.182. "182. For the execution of a decree or order of any civil Court not provided for by Art. 183 or by Sec. 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Three years or where a certified copy of the decree or order has been registered, six years. 1. The date of the decree or order, or

2. (Where there has been an appeal) the date of the final decree or order of the appellant Court, or the withdrawal of the appeal, or

3. (Where there has been a reviewof judgement) the date of the decision passed on the review or

4. (Where the decree has been amended) the date of amendment, or

5. (Where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final order passed on an application made in