NAGENDRA PRASAD SINGH, J.

1. The defendants are the appellants in this appeal. The plaintiffs-respondents filed a suit for eviction against one Bhola Prasad, father of the appellants, from one shop-room situated in Mahalla Chowk Road, Gaya, details whereof have been given in the Schedule attached to the plaint. According to the plaintiffs, aforesaid Bhola Prasad had defaulted in payment of rent, and, as such, a notice under S. 106 of the T. P. Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was served on him asking him to vacate the premises in question. Thereafter, the present suit was filed for eviction as well as for arrears of rent.

2. It is an admitted portion that the aforesaid Bhola Prasad had been inducted as a tenant in the aforesaid shop-room by the then landlord, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs purchased the shop-room in question under two registered sale deeds, dated 13-1-1969, from the erstwhile owners. Bhola Prasad was occupying the room in question as a monthly tenant and at a rental of Rs. 80.00 per month. It is also an admitted case that the monthly tenancy was to begin on first of each month and to end by the last day of the month. Bhola Prasad died during the pendency of the suit and in his place his two sons, the appellants, were substituted. Their defence, inter alia, was that there has been no default in payment of rent and the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties.

3. The trial court recorded the finding that there has been default in the payment of rent, and, as such, the defendants were liable to be evicted. It negatived the claim of the defendants that the suit was bad for non-joinder of parties. On the aforesaid findings the suit for eviction was decreed. On appeal before the learned District Judge, apart from urging that there was no default in payment of rent, two further points were urged on behalf of the defendants. Firstly, that after the death of the original defendant Bhola Prasad, only his two sons were impleaded as parties, his widow and his grand-sons were not impleaded, and, as such, the suit had abated. It was also pointed out that the notice under S. 106 of the Act, which was dated 22-9-1969, asked the defendants to vacate the premises in question by 31-10-1969. This was in breach of the requirement of S. 106 of the Act, and, as such, the tenancy was never terminated to give cause of action for filing the suit. Learned District Judge, while affirming other findings of the learned Munsif, held that the suit had not abated and the notice under S. 106 of the Act was valid.

4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the notice under S. 106 of the Act was itself invalid and the suit for eviction was not maintainable on that ground alone. He has also urged that omission to implead the widow of the original defendant after his death was fatal to the suit.

5. The invalidity of the notice has been pleaded on the basis that the present plaintiffs acquired, title to the shops in question by virtue of two sale deeds, dated 13-1-1969, and since that date relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence between the plaintiffs and the original defendant and the original defendant became a monthly tenant, under the plaintiffs since that date. This monthly tenancy will be deemed to have commenced on 13-1-1969 and to have ended on 12th Feb., 1969 and so on and so forth. In such a situation, the notice under S. 106 of the Act, which was dated 22-9-1969, should have asked the defendant to vacate the premises in question by a date "expiring with the end of a monthly tenancy", i. e., by 12th Oct., 1969 and not by 31st Oct., 1969 as has been mentioned in the notice in question. The Court of appeal below has rejected this submission taking the view that requirement of S. 106 of the Act (is) to give clear 15 days notice before the eviction is sought for and it will not make