MODI, J.—This is a defendants second appeal in a suit for ejectment which has been decreed by both courts below.

2. The material facts are short and simple. The plaintiffs purchased the suit shop along with two others by a sale-deed date the 17th July, 1956, EX.-3, from Mazhur Ali and Khurshed Alam who were the previous owners thereof. The defendant is a tenant in the suit shop. It is common ground between the parties that the rent payable by him was Rs. 4/-per mensem. The plaintiffs case was that they required the suit shop {in addition to the two other shops which they had purchased from Mazhar Ah and Kurshed Ali) for purposes of their own bonafide residence and so they gave a notice (Ex. A-1) to the defendant on the 24th January, 1957, asking him to vacate the shop by the 16th February, 1957. The plaintiffs thought that the tenancy between the defendant and the plaintiffs commenced on the 17th July, 1956, and consequently they gave the notice to the defendant to vacant the shop by the 16th February, 1957. Thereafter the plaintiffs gave a second notice (Ex. 2) on the 5th March 1957, presumably because it had struck them that the earlier notice was not good enough in law and in this second notice although they repeated that the defendant should quit the premises on the 16th April, 1957, on the footing that the tenancy began on the 17th July, 1956, they further took care to mention that if according to the defendant the tenancy commenced from the 1st of the English month, then the defendant should quit the premises by the 31st March, 1957. It was also mentioned in the notice that if the defendant thought that his tenancy commenced on the 1st of the dark half of the Hindi month, then he should quit the premises on the 31st March, 1957, and in case he thought that the tenancy commenced on the bright half The choice was thus which he thought his in any case the time of the Hindi month, then he should get out on the 14th April, 1957. given to the defendant to vacate the premises on any of these dates on tenancy would terminate, and it was also pointed out in the notice that allowed to him for quitting the premises was more than 15 days from the date of notice. As the defendant did not vacate the premises, the plaintiffs filed the present suit on the 29th May, 1957, on the allegation that they required the shop in suit for their bonafide residential purposes.

3. The defendant resisted the suit. He denied that the plaintiffs had any real necessity to occupy the shop of which he was in possession. He also contended that the notice which he had received from the plaintiffs was bad in law as being uncertain. It was finally contended that the first notice having been given to the defendant on the 24th January, 1957, the second notice could not form the basis of the suit as the first notice had not been waived. The courts below decided all these contentions in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suit. The defendant has now come up to this Court in second appeal.

4. On behalf of the defendant, the same contentions have been re-iterated before this Court as were canvassed before the courts below. I shall take up the question of personal necessity, to start with, and all that I need say in this connection is that this is substantially a question of fact and cannot be re-agitated in this second appeal. The courts below have given reasons why they came to the conclusion to which they did. I am unable to hold that the finding of the courts below on this point discloses any error of law. Consequently, I hold that learned counsel is not entitled to re-open this question at this stage of the litigation and the matter must rest concluded where the courts below have found it.

5. The next and the most important point which has been strenuously argued on behalf of the defendant before me is that the notice in this case on which the suit was founded was bad in law. Learned counsel bases his contention on the language of sec. 106 of the Transfer of Pr

Click Here to Read the rest of this document