The plaintiff is required to prove only material facts constituting the cause of action and not all the facts on which the whole cause of action is based.

1. The defendants preferred second appeal before this Court.

2. The plaintiffs filed the suit for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession in respect of the suit land. The plaintiffs also prayed that the orders of the Anchal Adhikari dated 31st May, 1955 be declared illegal and without jurisdiction. According to the plaint, the cause of action arose on 31st May, 1955 when the Anchal Adhikari by his order dated 31st May, 1955 removed the names of the plaintiffs and substituted the names of the defendants in their place in the revenue papers (tenants ledger). It is for this reason that the plaintiffs prayed in relief (b) that the Court be pleased to declare the order of the Anchal Adhikari as wrong, illegal and without jurisdiction. The case of the plaintiffs was that the ancestor of the defendants, namely, Bana Mahto. surrendered the suit land to the landlord. The landlord, in turn, settled the suit land in 1316 Fasli with the ancestors of the plaintiffs.

3. The defendants denied the story of surrender and settlement. The defendants pleaded that they were in continuous possession of the suit land, and, their ancestor, Bana Mahto, was rightly recorded in the survey record of rights.

4. Both the Courts below decreed the suit of the plaintiffs. On these facts, learned counsel for the appellants contends that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is vitiated for the simple reason that it declared the title and possession of the plaintiffs without setting aside the orders of the revenue authorities dated 31st May, 1955. 20th May, 1956 and 28th Sept., 1957.

5. In other words learned counsel for the appellants contends that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in the present case unless the cause of action is proved by the plaintiffs. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellants referred to paras. 8 and 11 of the plaint. According to the plaint, the cause of action in the present case arose on 31st May, 1955, when the Anchal Adhikari removed the names of the plaintiffs and substituted the names of defendants in their place in the revenue records in respect of the suit lands. It is also mentioned in paragraph No. 11 of the plaint that cause of action also arose on 20th May, 1956 and 28th Sept., 1957 when the order of the Anchal Adhikari dated 31st May, 1955 was upheld by the appellate and revisional authorities. In other words, according to the plaint the cause of action in the suit arose on 31st May, 1955. 20th May, 1956 and 28th Sept., 1957. In other words, learned counsel for the appellants contends that unless they prove the bundle of essential facts which constitutes cause of action, they cannot succeed in the suit.

6. The short point for decision in this case is :-

What is the meaning of cause of action ? The expression cause of action has been defined by Brett, J. in Cooke V/s. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 as follows :

" Cause of action has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse."

Lord Esher. M. R. has defined cause of action in Read V/s. Brown, 1888 22 QBD 128, as follows :-

"Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved."

The Supreme Court in the State of Madras V/s. C. P. Agencies, AIR 1960 SC 1309 followed the decisions of Brett, J. in Cooke V/s. Gill and Lord Esher in Read V/s. Brown (supra). In re D. Lakshminarayana Chettiar, AIR 1954 Mad 594, a Full Bench of Madras High Court held that " cause of action means the bundle of essential facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit." Relyon these decisions, I hold that the plaintiffs were required to pr