Judgment

S.R. DAS, CJI.. : The only controversy arising in this appeal by special leave relates to the validity of a notice of suit given under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff, which is the first respondent before us, to the first defendant, which is the appellant herein. The very language of S. 80 makes it clear,-and it has been so held by the Judicial. Committee in Bhagchand Dagdusa v. Secy. of State, 54 Ind App 338 which decision has been adopted by the same tribunal in many later cases- that S. 80 is express, explicit and mandatory and admits of no implications or exceptions. Section 80 peremptorily requires that no suit shall be filed against the Government or a public officer in respect of anything done in his official capacity until after the expiry of two months from the service of a notice in the manner therein prescribed stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the reliefs which he claims. There is no dispute that the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the reliefs claimed have been sufficiently stated in the notice. The only question is whether the cause of action has been so stated therein. Both the Courts below have held that it has been done.

2. The object of S. 80 is manifestly to give the Government or the public officer sufficient notice of the case which is proposed to be brought against it or him so that it or he may consider the position and decide for itself or himself whether the claim of the plaintiff should be accepted or resisted. In order to enable the Government or the public officer to arrive at a decision it is necessary that it or he should be informed of the nature of the suit proposed to be filed against it or him and the facts on which the claim is founded and the precise reliefs asked for. As already stated, the reliefs claimed have been quite clearly formulated. The only question is whether the cause of action has been stated in the notice. The answer to the question depends on the interpretation of the notice given under S. 80. This being the true position, it is not necessary for us to refer to the decisions requiring the identity of the person who issues the notice and the person who brings the suit as it Vellayan Chettiar v. Govt. of Madras, 74 Ind App 223:and in Government of the Province of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia, 76 Ind App 85: or those requiring the identity of the cause of action in two suits brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant as a condition for the applicability of O. II, R. 2, Code of Civil Procedure, as in Mohammad Khalil Khan v. Mahbub Ali Mian, 75 Ind App 121:

3. We have been referred to the well-known observations of Brett J. in Cooke v. Gill, (1873) 8 CP 107 and to the definition of "cause of action" given in Read v. Brown, (1888) 22 QBD which are all referred to in 75 Ind App 121: (supra). In (1888) 22 QBD 128 (supra), Lord Esher M. R., defined "cause of action" to mean

"Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved."

Fry L. J. agreed and said:

"Everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action." To the same effect are the observations of Lopes L. J. in Mst. Chand Kour v. Partab Singh, 15 Ind App 156. :Lord Watson observed:

"Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour."

The meaning of "cause of action" being thus well understood,