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PATNA HIGH COURT
M. P. Singh, J.
Motipur Sugar Factory Ltd.
Versus
State Of Bihar
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2716 of 1976 ;
Decided On : FEBRUARY 22, 1978
CEILING AREA AND ACQUISITION OF SURPLUS LAND ACT - SECTION 5 (1) (III) - ACT CONSTITUTIONALITY - BASIC STRUCTURE PRINCIPLE - ALTERNATIVE REMEDY - WRIT MAINTAINABILITY - JURISDICTION - LOCUS STANDI - TRANSFEROR'S RIGHT TO CHALLENGE POST-TRANSFER ORDER - APPELLATE AUTHORITY'S JURISDICTION - ACT'S INTENT AND REFORM MANNER - COMPANY'S SPOUSE - ACT'S INJUSTICE - DEBT RELIEF ACT - COURT'S ROLE: 1. The Act's constitutionality cannot be challenged based on the basic structure principle; it applies only to laws amending the Constitution, not ordinary laws. 2. Writ petition is not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 30 of the Act. 3. The High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition since the petitioners have an alternative remedy. 4. Transferor lacks locus standi to challenge a post-transfer order as the invasion, if any, is of the transferees' rights. 5. Appellate authority has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the impugned order, including the Act's constitutionality. 6. The Act's intent to carry out agrarian reforms is not challenged; the manner of reform is alleged to violate constitutional guarantees. 7. Including a company in the definition of land-holder by legal fiction is not erroneous; the Supreme Court has overruled similar arguments. 8. The Act's potential to cause injustice in some cases is not a ground for the Court to interfere; the legislature's generalizations are necessary for practical considerations. 9. The Act's constitutionality cannot be challenged on the basis of offending the Constitution's basic structure.
Fact of the Case:
Petitioners challenged an order annulling land transfers made to defeat the Bihar Land Reforms Act's ceiling provisions. They argued the Act was unconstitutional, violating the basic structure principle, and sought to invoke the High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227. The respondents contended the writ petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal and that the petitioners lacked locus standi as the transferees were not challenging the order.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the Act's constitutionality could not be challenged based on the basic structure principle, as it applied only to laws amending the Constitution. The writ petition was not maintainable due to the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal. The High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The transferor lacked locus standi to challenge the post-transfer order. The appellate authority had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the impugned order, including the Act's constitutionality. The Act's intent to carry out agrarian reforms was not challenged; the manner of reform was alleged to violate constitutional guarantees. Including a company in the definition of land-holder by legal fiction was not erroneous, as the Supreme Court had overruled similar arguments. The Act's potential to cause injustice in some cases was not a ground for the Court to interfere, as the legislature's generalizations were necessary for practical considerations. The Act's constitutionality could not be challenged on the basis of offending the Constitution's basic structure.
Issues: 1. Can the Act's constitutionality be challenged based on the basic structure principle? 2. Is the writ petition maintainable considering the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal? 3. Does the High Court have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition? 4. Does the transferor have locus standi to challenge a post-transfer order? 5. Does the appellate authority have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the impugned order, including the Act's constitutionality? 6. Is the Act's intent to carry out agrarian reforms challenged, or is it the manner of reform that is alleged to violate constitutional guarantees? 7. Is including a company in the definition of land-holder by legal fiction erroneous? 8. Can the Act's potential to cause injustice in some cases be a ground for the Court to interfere? 9. Can the Act's constitutionality be challenged on the basis of offending the Constitution's basic structure?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The basic structure principle applies only to laws amending the Constitution, not ordinary laws. 2. The availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal bars the maintainability of the writ petition. 3. The High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition due to the alternative remedy. 4. The transferor lacks locus standi to challenge a post-transfer order as the invasion, if any, is of the transferees' rights. 5. The appellate authority has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the impugned order, including the Act's constitutionality. 6. The Act's intent to carry out agrarian reforms is not challenged; the manner of reform is alleged to violate constitutional guarantees. 7. Including a company in the definition of land-holder by legal fiction is not erroneous; the Supreme Court has overruled similar arguments. 8. The Act's potential to cause injustice in some cases is not a ground for the Court to interfere; the legislature's generalizations are necessary for practical considerations. 9. The Act's constitutionality cannot be challenged on the basis of offending the Constitution's basic structure.
Final Decision: The writ petition was dismissed as having abated due to the availability of an alternative remedy by way of appeal. The petitioners were left to bear their own costs.
M. P. Singh, J.
1. This writ petition challenges the order of the Additional collector, Muzzaffarpur, dated 13th November, 1976 at Annexure 2 in Ceiling case No.25 of 1973-74 passed under Sec.5 (1) (iii) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceilling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (briefly the Act ). By that order the Additional Collector held that the transfers of 943.76 acres of land on 31 August, 1970 by the petitioner with the shareholders of the Sugar Factory, Motipur were made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act. He accordingly annulled those transfers and declared that the said land shall be deemed to be held by the petitioners for the purposes of determining the ceiling area. The petitioners went in appeal against that order and it is pending before the Collector, Muzaffarpur while persuing this statutory remedy available to the petitioners, they have also invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution for quashing the said order of the Additional Collector.
2. By order of this Court dated 18th January, 1978 the petitioners were allowed to amend the writ petition by addition a new paragraph 32-A containing additional grounds of Annexure 6 challenging the vires of the Act. In the writ petition no such ground has been taken. In the counter-affidavit the respondents have stated that after due enquiry, it transpired that the sale of 943.75 acres of land was made on only one day, i. e. on 31 August, 1970, just eight days before the commencement of the revised Land Ceiling Act with the shareholders of the sugar factory who were either members of the same family or relatives. It is alleged that the transactions were sham or benami, the land having been found in physical possession of the sugar factory. As these transactions were held to be made with the object of defeating the provisions of the Act and to keep more land than the ceiling limit, they were annulled under Section 5 (1) (iii) of the Act. It is also stated that the writ petition is not maintainable in view of the new constitutional provisions without exhausting the alternative remedy of appeal provided in Sec.30 of the Act which is already pending.
3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the Act is unconstitutional, ultra vires and void because it affects the basic structure of the Constitution. Reliance has been placed upon the case of Kesvananda bharati, (AIR 1973 SC 1461) known as the Basic structure case. The core of his submission is this : According to the preamble to the Cocstitution the people of India have adopted, enacted and given to themselves the Constitution and that people are sovereign, the constition was enacted by the people and it is for the people. Sovereignity, therefore, rests in the people. People of India are an entity and they cannot be disintegrated. The Act under challenge offends the basic structure by ignoring the existence of a large number of women and children who form integral part of the Indian people. Sovereignity of the people cannot be touched by the Legislature. The Act treats as non tst a vast majority of people belonging to the female sex and children whose rights have been ignored in the act. The Act, therefore, annihilates them of the capacity cf being individuals having their civic rights and it does not simply deprive them of their property rights. The existence of the individual is denied, his civic rights inherent in his existence are being denied and an individual as such is not recognised under an artificial concept of the word "family". Individual member of the society are treated as civilly dead under the device of their artificial merger in clear disregard of social and lexicographic connotation of the term. Learned counsel also submitted that there was lack of legislative competence to enact the Act and fixing the ceiling for the family of an artificial concept. He docs not dispute that fixing of ceiling limi
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