The High Court cannot interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in the absence of mala fide, particularly when the order of dismissal has been approved by the Industrial Tribunal in a judicial proceeding.

S.N.Jha, J.

1. The petitioner, who was in employment of the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation (in short the Corporation) as Conductor, was dismissed from service in a departmental proceeding. He has challenged the order of dismissal dated 26-7-1984 passed by the Chief of Administration of the said Corporation, as also the order passed by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, dated 16-12-1986, on his representation against the said order of dismissal. Copies of the aforesaid two orders have been marked as Annexure 2 and 1, respectively, to the writ petition.

2. A departmental proceeding was instituted on the basis of certain charges as contained in Annexure 9 alleging that on 19-3-1983 bus No. BHQ 708, of which he was the Conductor, was checked by the Central Squad and 23 passengers were found traveling without tickets out of 39 passengers, ft was also alleged that he had realized fare from; 5 such unbooked passengers without issuing tickets to them. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 24-4-1984 holding that the second charge, namely, pre-realization of fare from 15 unbooked passengers had not been proved. However, according to Inquiry Officer the first charge was proved. On consideration of the report and the other materials, the disciplinary authority, namely, Chief of Administration, passed the aforesaid order of dismissal stating, inter alia, therein that the petitioner had earlier been found to have committed the same kind of misconduct/irregularity on 22 occasions and for that he had been suspended and punished on several occasions.

3. It would not be out of place to mention here that, on account of the fact that the proceeding relating to some industrial dispute concerning the Corporation and its employees was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, an application was made before the Tribunal for approval of the order of dismissal, as required by the proviso to Clause (b) of Sec. 33(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (in short the Act). The Tribunal took evidence of parties, in which the petitioner participated by examining, cross-examining witnesses, and finally by order dated 8-12-1984 it approved the aforesaid order of dismissal. It is relevant to mention here that these facts have not been stated at all in the writ petition and, accordingly, no prayer also has been made for quashing of the said order of the Tribunal dated 8-12-1984. These facts have come on records in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation.

4. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has questioned the correctness of the impugned orders on two-fold ground. He has submitted that the report of the Inquiry Officer, which has been relied upon by the Disciplinary Authority, was not made available to the petitioner depriving him of the opportunity of making a representation against the findings as contained therein. Reliance in this connection has been placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s. Md. Ramzan Khan AIR 1991 SC 471. He has also submitted that the Disciplinary Authority has erred in passing the order of dismissal taking into account the past antecedents of the petitioner without giving any opportunity to explain the same. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed on two decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of The State of Mysore V/s. Manche Gowda -- and Binny Limited V/s. Their Workmen -- . Learned Counsel alternatively submitted that, in any view, the order of dismissal was disproportionate to the nature of the charges and, therefore, this Court should at least interfere with the quantum of punishment as has been done recently by the Supreme Court in the case of V.R. Katarki V/s. State of Karnataka -- . Mr. Jha also, while dealing with the contention raised in the counter-affidavit that the order of dismissal having merged in the order of the Industrial Tribunal, in the absence of any relief seeking quashing of the said order of the industrial Tribunal,