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1996 Supreme(Pat) 432

PATNA HIGH COURT
M.Y.Eqbal, J.
New India Assurance Company Limited
Versus
Yasoda Devi
Appeal from Original Order No. 281 of 1992 ;
Decided On : JULY 18, 1996

Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 does not have retrospective operation.

Headnote:

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT - Sec. 140 - Retrospective operation - Whether Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1988") shall have retrospective operation?

Fact of the Case:

Claimant respondent No. 1 filed a Claim petition before the District Judge, Purnia, under Sec. 110-A of the Act of 1939 for grant of compensation alleging therein that, on 24.6.1989, his son Dilip Kumar Yadav aged about 23 years, while going to Purnia, on a bus bearing registration No. BHK 8919, fell down in a ditch near Roskagarh in village Baniapati, Purnia, as a result of which the said Dilip Kumar Yadav died.

Finding of the Court:

The Tribunal, while holding the same, relied upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1992 Raj. 62.

Issues: Whether the order of the Claim Tribunal awarding Rs. 25000.00 as interim compensation in purposed exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988 in respect of a claim arising out of an accident occurred when the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1939) was in force, is in accordance with law?

Ratio Decidendi: The provision of Sec. 140 has no retrospective operation.

Final Decision: The interim award under appeal shall stand modified inasmuch as the amount of the interim compensation payable shall be Rs. 15,000.00 and not Rs. 25,000.00 as has been allowed by the learned Tribunal.

Judgment

M.Y.Eqbal, J.

1. The question involved in this appeal is whether Sec. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1988") shall have retrospective operation? In other words, whether the order of the Claim Tribunal awarding Rs. 25000.00 as interim compensation in purposed exercise of jurisdiction under Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988 in respect of a claim arising out of an accident occurred when the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1939) was in force, is in accordance with law?

2. The fact of the case before me is very short. The claimant respondent No. 1 filed a Claim petition before the District Judge, Purnia, under Sec. 110-A of the Act of 1939 for grant of compensation alleging therein that, on 24.6.1989, his son Dilip Kumar Yadav aged about 23 years, while going to Purnia, on a bus bearing registration No. BHK 8919, fell down in a ditch near Roskagarh in village Baniapati, Purnia, as a result of which the said Dilip Kumar Yadav died. In the said claim case, which was registered as Compensation Case No. 49 of 1989, the claimant respondent No. 1, filed an application on 30.8.1990, claiming interim compensation of Rs. 25,000.00 under Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988. The appellant opposite party, namely, the Insurance Company, filed a rejoinder to the above petition stating therein that the accident took place on 24.6.1989, i.e., before the commencement of the Act of 1988. Therefore, the claimant is not entitled to get the benefit of Sec. 140 of the said Act of 1988.

3. Learned Claims Tribunal disposed of the said application in terms of order dated 23.7.1992 which is impugned in this appeal. The learned Tribunal held that the claimants are entitled to get the benefit under Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988 and are entitled to interim compensation of Rs. 25,000.00 . According to the Tribunal, although the accident took place on 24.6.1989, the petition for interim compensation was filed on 23.8.1989, i.e., after the commencement of the Act of 1988, the petition shall be governed by the Act of 1988 and not by the Act of 1939. The Tribunal, while holding the same, relied upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1992 Raj. 62.

4. The only point canvassed before me by the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the Tribunal was in error in applying the provision of Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988 and awarding Rs. 25,000.00 instead of Rs. 15,000.00 as compensation under the no fault liability. He submitted that, since accident took place when the Act of 1939 was in force, the petition for grant of interim compensation shall be governed by Sec. 92-A of the Act of 1939 and not by Sec. 140 of the Act of 1988. He further submitted that the provision of Sec. 140 has no retrospective operation.

5. Before deciding the question, it is necessary to look into the legislative history under different Acts which deals with the grant of compensation as a result of fatal injury. Before 1939, there was no Act, namely, Motor Vehicles Act and cases for compensation in respect of death or injury were being governed by the Fatal Accident Act, 1855. In 1939, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was enacted and by Chapter VIII of the said Act, an alternative forum was created for deciding the question of compensation payable for the death or injury caused on account of Motor Vehicles Accident and they have not modified in any manner a substantive law governing the said question. It is worth to mention here that, when the Fatal Accident Act was enacted, there was no motor vehicle in road in India. Today, lakhs of motor vehicles are put on road and the largest number of injuries and deaths are taking place on road on account of motor vehicles accident. In view of fast and consistently increasing the load on traffic, a number of hit and run cases where the drivers of the motor vehicles who cause the accident are not known have also increased in number. In order to meet the social demand and recomme



























































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