S.K.Katriar, J.

1. Heard Mr. Chandrashekhar Prasad Singh for the appellant and Mr. Nand Kishore Prasad Sinha for the respondents. The plaintiff is the appellant against a common order dated 21.5.2002, passed by the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Buxar, in Title Appeal Nos. 8 of 1991 and 9 of 1991, Bihari Lal Gupta and Ors. V/s. Dumraon Properties and Enterprises (P) Ltd., whereby he has set aside the common judgment and decree dated 23.2.1991, passed by the learned 1st, Munsif, Buxar, in Title Suit No. 31 of 1980/8 of 1990 and Title Suit No. 32 of 1980/9 of 1990. The trial Court had decreed the suits for eviction which has been set aside by the impugned judgment and the matters have been remitted back to the trial Court for a fresh judgment in accordance with law after determining the issue relating to payment of ad valorem Court fee raised by the parties before the lower appellate Court.

2. M.A. No. 336 of 2002 arises out of Title Appeal No. 8 of 1991 which in its turn, has arisen out of Title Suit No. 31 of 1980. The analogous M.A. No. 340 of 2002 has arisen out of Title Appeal No. 9 of 1991 which, in its turn, has arisen out of Title Suit No. 32 of 1980. Both the Courts below have disposed of the two matters by a common judgment/order and, therefore, the two appeals are being disposed of by a common order.

3. The plaintiff instituted the two suits for the eviction of the defendants from the suit premises. The suit was decreed. Aggrieved by the judgment and the decree, the defendants (respondents herein) preferred appeals before the learned District Judge. The defendants raised the question of payment of Ad valorem Court fee. In that view of the matter, the learned Court of appeal below has set aside the judgment of the learned trial Court and has remitted the matter back to him for determination of the question of suit valuation.

4. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the plaintiff (appellant) submits that the learned Court of appeal below has passed the impugned order completely overlooking the provisions of sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1987, the learned Court of appeal below did not apply himself to the issue whether or not the objection as to the payment of ad valorem Court-fee was raised by the defendants at the first instance, i.e. before the trial Court. He next submits that the Court will have also to satisfy itself whether or not the over-valuation or under- valuation of the suit has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit. He relies on the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1954 SC 340, paragraphs 11, 12 and 14, Kiran Singh and Ors. V/s. Chaman Paswan and Ors. He lastly submits that even if the question of over-valuation or under- valuation of the suit in his estimation did arise, then the course open to him was to dispose of the matters on merits and in the process decide the question of Court-fee and, in the event of being leviable, he should have himself assessed the Court-fee. He relies on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1985 PLJR 891, Raghubar Dayal Prasad V/s. Ramekbal Sah.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents (defendants) has supported the impugned order. He has, inter alia, submitted that the question of valuation of the suit goes to the root of the matter and proper valuation thereof may change the very forum of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. He has also made efforts to satisfy this Court that he has been prejudicially affected by improper valuation of the suit.

6. I do not wish to observe in detail about the merits of the issue, namely, proper valuation of the suit in view of the nature of the order that I am going to pass. I would only like to indicate the proper course that ought to have been followed by the learned Court of appeal below. sec. 11 of the Act is the most important and the relevant provision of law in this connection which lays down to the effect that the objection as to pro