The limited ownership right acquired by Sahodra did not turn into full right after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as it was not in recognition of any pre-existing right.

Barin Ghosh and Madhavendra Saran JJ.

1. One Abhilakh Rai had two sons; namely, Swarath Rai and Kritanath Rai, who were married respectively to Ajora Kuer and Sahodra Kuer. Swarath and Ajora had a daughter, namely, Dhanrajia, who was married to Nagina and had a son, Balbhadra. In the year 1923, Swarath and Kritanath died whereupon Ajora and Sahodra executed a deed of gift dated 26th May, 1923 and thereby gifted the properties, which were jointly owned by Swarath and Kritanath, to Balbhadra, who was then three years old.

2. The writ petitioners, who are the descendants of the siblings of Abhilakh, filed Title Suit No. 37 of 1923 seeking a declaration that Ajora and Sahodra, having no title to the land-in-question, could not gift the same and, accordingly, the deed of gift dated 26th May, 1923 is not valid.

3. The said title suit was compromised on 14th December, 2003 and the decree thereon was sealed and signed on 18th December, 1923. The compromise decree provided that until such time either Ajora or Sahodra would live, they would possess the property-in-question to its entirety, but after the death of both, half of the property will go to Balbhadra and the remaining half to the ancestors of the writ petitioners.

4. In the year, 1967 Sahodra died. Prior thereto Ajora died.

5. There is no dispute that Sahodra had a daughter, namely, Parvatia. Parvatia claimed that she is entitled to a part of the property-in-question. A proceeding under Sec.144 of the Criminal Procedure Code was initiated which was converted ultimately into a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and in the said proceeding it had been recorded that Parvatia is in occupation of 1/ 4th of the subject property.

6. After Sahodra died, the directions contained in the compromise decree were given effect to by recording entitlement of the parties thereto in pursuance therewith in the records of right. However, at that stage, while the writ petitioners were shown to be entitle to the subject property to the extent of half thereof, it was shown that Balbhadra is entitled to hold 1/4th thereof and the remaining 1/4th Parvatia was entitled to hold.

7. In 1974/75 proceedings were initiated under the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1955 to prepare a register of lands pertaining to the land-in-question. In the land register pertaining to the land-in-question, as was prepared and published, it was shown that the petitioners are entitled to half of land-in-question, Balbhadra is entitled to 1/4th of the land-in-question and Parvatia is entitled to the remaining 1/4th. To this, an objection was filed by Balbhadra. He contended that having regard to what has been provided in Clause (5) of the compromise, inasmuch as, he has challenged the compromise, the same cannot be looked at, and as such, the writ petitioners cannot claim to be entitled to any part of the land-in-question on the strength of the said compromise. This contention was rejected by the first authority. On appeal, the appellate authority read Clause (5) of the compromise in the manner Balbhadra wanted the appellate authority to read the same and, accordingly, concluded that inasmuch as Balbhadra has challenged the compromise, the compromise is of no effect and on the strength thereof writ petitioners cannot claim to have acquired title to any part of the land-in-question. The revision filed by the writ petitioners was dismissed when the view expressed by the appellate authority was accepted.

8. The writ petitioners, therefore, approached the writ court and contended that the orders passed by the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority are bad inasmuch as the same are based on misreading of Clause (5) of the compromise. The compromise is written in Kaithi language. Clause (5) thereof in fact prevents any of the parties to challenge the compromise. The writ court, accordingly, proceeded on the basis that the appellate authority as well the