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2010 Supreme(Pat) 2198
PATNA HIGH COURT
Shiva Kirti Singh and Hemant Kumar Srivastava JJ.
Guwahati, Assam
Versus
Bidya Nand Choudhary Son Of Late Ram Jeevan Choudhary
CWJC No. 11570 of 2005 12077 of 2005
Decided On : SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the term 'any civil proceeding' in Section 117 of the Indian Railways Act, which was held to include disciplinary proceedings with civil consequences.
Headnote:
Railways Act - Interpretation of 'any civil proceeding' - The court interpreted the term 'any civil proceeding' in Section 117 of the Indian Railways Act and held that it should be given a wider meaning, including disciplinary proceedings with civil consequences.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered two writ petitions challenging the orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna, which relied on statements made by employees before the Justice G.N.Ray Commission in relation to a railway accident.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the use of statements made by the employees was not permissible under Section 117 of the Indian Railways Act, as it includes all proceedings affecting civil rights, which are not criminal in nature.
Issues: The issues revolved around the interpretation of the term 'any civil proceeding' in Section 117 of the Railways Act and its applicability to disciplinary proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the term 'any civil proceeding' should be given a wider meaning, including disciplinary proceedings with civil consequences, based on the wording of the provision and the absence of any other exceptions.
Final Decision: The court dismissed both writ petitions, concurring with the opinion of the learned Tribunal that the proceedings were decided on the basis of no evidence, and granted liberty to the petitioners to proceed against the delinquent employees if they so choose.
Shiva Kirti Singh and Hemant Kumar Srivastava JJ.
1. Both the writ petitions raise a common question of law with a view to challenge the correctness and legality of impugned orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench, Patna. In the case of Bidya Nand Choudhary, the impugned order is dated 3.6.2005 (Annexure-4) passed in O.A. No.697 of 2004. In the other case also the impugned order is dated 3.6.2005 but passed in O.A. No. 764/2002 filed by the two petitioners of the other case, Yadunandan Roy and Balkishan Roy.
2. In both the cases the learned Tribunal noticed that the charge-sheet relied only upon statement made by the concerned employees before the Justice G.N.Ray Commission which was admittedly constituted under Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 in relation to a railway accident on 1.2.1999 involving collision between Awadh Assam Express and Brahmputra Mail at Gaisal within Katihar Division. The Tribunal found that use of statements made by the concerned employees/delinquent was not permissible in view of provisions in Section 117 of the Indian Railways Act which reads as follows: "117. Statement made before Commissioner. No statement made by a person in the course of giving evidence in an inquiry before the Commissioner shall subject him to, or be used against him in, any civil or criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement: Provided that the statement is
(a) made in reply to a question which is required by the Commissioner to answer; or
(b) relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry."
3. The learned Tribunal placed reliance upon a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh V/s. Gendalall, AIR 1966 SC 1445 for interpreting the words any civil proceeding so as to include all proceedings affecting civil rights, which are not criminal in nature. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the said judgment for pointing out that the wide meaning given to the words any civil proceeding was in context of Article 133 of the Constitution of India and in relation to jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and hence, the same should not be held applicable while interpreting Section 117 of the Railways Act, 1989 .
4. Before considering the aforesaid submission, it is relevant to point out that Section 117 is applicable only in case of evidence in an inquiry before the Commissioner as defined under the Railways Act, 1989 and not before the Commissioner appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. However, this fact would not have any material effect on the outcome of these writ petitions because Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is same as Section 117 of the Railways Act, 1989 .
5. Having clarified the position relating to applicability of the different Acts, the issue remains the samewhat should be the interpretation of the term any civil proceeding? On a careful consideration of the wordings used in Section 6 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act which are same as the wordings in Section 117 of the Railways Act, we are of the considered view that use of the word "any" followed by an exception after the word proceeding leaves no manner of doubt that the term any civil proceeding has to be given a wider meaning as was done by the Apex Court while interpreting Article 133 of the Constitution. The exception is only a prosecution for giving false evidence by such statement. In view of only one exception being provided by the Legislature it is further confirmed that all other proceedings are covered by the term any civil or criminal proceeding. There is no difficulty in visualizing that any proceeding, by going to the root of the proceeding, can be classified as civil or criminal proceeding. The disciplinary proceeding will obviously fall into such wider meaning of "any civil proceeding" because ultimately a disciplinary proceeding has civil consequences.
6. In view of aforesaid discussion, we are in agreemen
